Public Needs to Sit Tight on Arms Talks

So now the two superpowers are to resume arms-control talks. What is more, they seem about to do so in a wide-ranging way that will put on the table for discussion both strategic and medium-range missile systems as well as space weapons including President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative--”Star Wars.”

What has happened? Has Reagan forgotten his “evil empire” characterization of the Soviet Union? Have the Soviets decided to revive detente?

The massive press coverage given to last week’s Shultz-Gromyko meetings might lead one to believe that we are on the verge of world peace or, at least, that rapid progress might be expected.

But lest we let hopes be raised only to risk having them dashed, we ought to realize that progress in these negotiations, which will at a minimum consume many months, will depend on the seriousness and realism of the negotiating parties and, particularly in the United States, of the leaders of the two major political parties.

In the Democratic Party, liberals and arms-control adherents in particular will be set off balance temporarily by the large and seemingly open context of the prospective negotiations. Yet it is clear that, given their longstanding distrust of Reagan’s commitment to arms control and to the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, they will be tempted to put negative constructions on any perceived setback in the talks or in the evolution of the U.S. negotiating position. (We can expect a flood of press leaks about Defense/State Department/hard-line/soft-line struggles on the way to the table.) They will also be tempted to charge, with some justification, that the Reagan “Star Wars” initiative is so destabilizing that its very continuation during the negotiations might poison the environment for the talks. For the time being, these potential critics should withhold judgment and give the President a chance.

In the Republican Party, and particularly among conservatives in the Reagan Administration, there will be a temptation to see a sinister Red plot behind each possible Soviet concession (“If they’re willing to give that away, it must be worthless”). Some major players in the Reagan foreign policy/defense Establishment have made their careers as Soviet-baiters. And prospective negotiator Max Kampelman, although a Democrat, was an unabashed advocate of the Vietnam War and has been an ally in the past of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Richard N. Perle and others who might be expected to be in-house skeptics, and, though able, has not previously been involved directly in arms-control negotiations. The previous negotiator, Paul H. Nitze, enjoyed a reputation as a tough guy but also was recognized as being enormously knowledgeable regarding that arcane subject. All these factors could lead to a self-defeating syndrome on the U.S. side of the talks without the President’s even being aware of it. Members of the President’s party and his Administration ought therefore to take him at his word and lend support to his apparent policy.

The Soviets will have to restrain themselves from the temptation to use the talks for a new “peace offensive” or to try to divide the United States from its allies. On the contrary, they should welcome the NATO solidarity that might more readily yield a positive result than the disarray that could stop anything from happening.

The American people ought to know that there is little benign in all this. Konstantin U. Chernenko does not aspire to a Burger King franchise. Nor has Reagan suddenly found attractive aspects in Marxism. Both parties will be at the table because each believes that it has a clear self-interest in doing so. Neither country wants to enter a frighteningly dangerous round of weapons development and deployment in space. Both need to reduce the enormous defense burdens that are distorting and threatening their domestic economies. (Ask Reagan, for instance, whether his deficit-reduction program might not benefit from saving the $25 billion now budgeted for “Star Wars” research and the other billions that could be saved by junking or cutting back other weapons systems.)

Good feelings are beside the point. We are talking about grown-up countries, in the classic sense, representing their respective interests on deadly serious matters. If political and public opinion will allow the discussions to stay that way, then we might, just might, have reason for hope.