Getting Too Close

The United States is supplying about $250 million in aid this year to the Afghan guerrillas. That is 10 times the amount of U.S. aid that was going to the anti-Sandinista contras in Nicaragua before Congress cut off funds.

Unlike the Nicaragua funds, extra money for covert aid to Afghanistan’s freedom fighters was virtually forced on an initially dubious Central Intelligence Agency by Congress.

The time has come to take a very serious look at whether large-scale U.S. military aid to the Afghan guerrillas is in the American interest--or, for that matter, in the long-term interest of the Afghan people themselves.

Let there be no mistake: Afghanistan is a victim of naked Soviet military aggression. Soviet troops invaded in December, 1979, to impose a Marxist government of Moscow’s choosing. When the occupation encountered armed resistance from the fiercely anti-communist Muslim population, the Soviet Union launched a brutal pacification campaign that has driven millions of Afghans--perhaps a third of the total population--into refugee camps in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.

Guerrilla resistance is depriving the Soviets of a clear-cut victory. But the Soviet Union is big, and Afghanistan is small. The rebels vow to fight on, but their long-term prospects are bleak.

The CIA is said to have covertly channeled clothing, medical supplies, small arms (mostly of Soviet manufacture) and money for food to the anti-Soviet resistance forces since shortly after the invasion. As recently as 1983, however, CIA aid totaled only about $30 million, and there were no plans for an increase.

Then, according to the Washington Post, Rep. Charles Wilson (D-Tex.) began tacking secret amendments onto defense-appropriation bills. The CIA is now getting $250 million or more a year for its Afghan aid operation--all this without much public debate or even notice.

The courageous Afghans deserve the sympathy of the world. As long as they are determined to resist, they also have a moral claim to outside military and financial aid, however grim their prospects. It does not follow, however, that the United States should play the lead role in supplying such aid.

A $250-million “covert” aid program cannot really be covert. It spells commitment of a scope that, once accepted, cannot easily be abandoned without the appearance of an American defeat or sellout of the Afghan rebels.

If new U.S.-supplied weapons prove effective against Soviet helicopter gunships now being used with deadly effect, the Soviets may feel compelled to escalate the war by bringing in more troops and bombers. They might even take direct military action against Pakistan, which is serving as a staging ground for the guerrillas. Since Pakistan is a U.S. ally, the result could be a big-power confrontation that would not be in anybody’s interest.

Such an escalation is much less likely to occur if countries in the region take the lead roles in providing military aid. The obvious candidates are Afghanistan’s Muslim neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, plus the oil-rich Arab states and China.

The national interest of these countries is more directly involved than that of the United States because they are the most threatened by the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan. Collectively they have more than enough money to foot the bill for whatever amount of aid is required. As a matter of fact, these sources are reported to be supplying $200 million per year in aid to the Afghan resistance movement already.

If more effective weapons are needed, the United States can perhaps help, within limits. But the CIA should not be drawn into the business of effectively managing a large-scale guerrilla war virtually on the border of the Soviet Union.