Nuclear On-Site Inspections

Alton Frye’s article (Dec. 14), “Nuclear Moratorium: a Middle Path--Offer of On-Site Verification Shouldn’t Be Casually Dismissed,” was contradictory and misleading. It played on the discredited theme that we can’t trust the Russians to stop nuclear testing because we lack the visual assistance of on-site verification personnel. In our age of advanced electronic surveillance technology, this is ludicrous.

If “real arms control” is possible only when the “Soviets and Americans inspect each other’s nuclear test sites,” as Frye asserted, then how did he know the Soviet Union had been continually engaged in a “unilateral and unreciprocated suspension of tests” since last August?

The point is, on-site verification measures are unnecessary for establishing compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty, contrary to Frye’s inference.

Former CIA Director William Colby substantiates this. As The Times reported on May 1, 1985, Colby was asked, “Can we trust the Russians?” “Yes, we can,” Colby replied, “and, secondly, we don’t have to. We can watch them.” He added, “We have not had a strategic surprise since Sputnik. We can trust the Russians to do what’s in their interests” and they are “quite frantic” to stop “Star Wars” and the further pressures it would put on their economy.

Colby is referring to the fact that our already existing satellites and seismic stations are sufficient to ensure compliance with both a bilateral nuclear freeze and comprehensive underground nuclear test ban treaty-- without the assistance of on-site verification measures.

Though Frye didn’t mention it, that is probably why he confidently stated the Soviets had suspended the tests. He certainly didn’t just take their word for it.

CHARLES SIMPSON

Los Angeles