More Has Been Gained Than Lost at Sidra

How should the United States respond to state-sponsored terrorism? Ever since the Iranian hostage crisis, Americans have had to grapple with that problem. It persists as the barely disguised issue behind the U.S.-Libyan confrontation. The Gulf of Sidra is a new answer. For the first time the United States replied with force to punish and presumably deter terrorism.

But is that morally right, particularly as a general principle? The terrorists are most often unknown or known only late; the evidence is always murky. Doesn’t the use of force backfire, making heroes of scoundrels, embarrassing U.S. allies and precipitating yet another round of violence?

But if terrorism is unpunished, won’t it continue or escalate? This is the U.S. dilemma. Since the hostage crisis, attacks on U.S. citizens abroad have increased, fed by the anti-Americanism of the men in Tehran and the example set by the unprecedented success of their lawlessness.

Terrorism has grown more purposeful and more difficult to ignore. Terrorists regularly aim to humiliate the United States; it is a means to their ends. The brutal indignities heaped on Americans when they have been taken hostage suggest that something else lies behind the terrorists’ ostensible demands. Did the hijackers of the TWA plane last June, who singled out Americans for beatings and murder, really seek the release of Israeli-held prisoners (who were already being let go)? Wasn’t it ultimately a political maneuver in Beirut, triggered by the final Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, just as the real issue in Iran quickly became the mullahs’ bid for control?

Although paralysis in the face of the hostage crisis defeated President Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan changed little of substance in U.S. policy on terrorism. Secretaries George P. Shultz and Caspar W. Weinberger continued the Zbigniew Brzezinski-Cyrus Vance debate of the Carter Administration--whether to meet terrorism with force or to accept the limits of American power. This Administration lost two embassies (Kuwait, West Beirut) and a chancellery (East Beirut)--and did nothing. With the TWA hijacking, Reagan negotiated for the hostages’ release, just like Carter.

Is the Gulf of Sidra a turning point for the United States then? Not in itself. The Shultz-Weinberger debate produced a very restrictive compromise. Retaliation should not hurt any innocents, only the culprits. And Washington will choose the terms of engagement, where the balance of forces favors the United States.

The Gulf of Sidra was unique, and the opportunity that it presented unlikely to be repeated. Freedom of navigation provided the legal principle that the United States needed to challenge Libyan strongman Col. Moammar Kadafi, and he obliged by firing the first shot, allowing the United States to answer for Rome and Vienna.

But it was not only Kadafi’s recklessness that created the opportunity. The Gulf of Sidra was well prepared. Americans had already been told to quit Libya, leaving few potential hostages. Nothing else was on the diplomatic agenda that would be lost by confrontation--Arab-Israeli negotiations had already collapsed, and, with summitry on hold, U.S. action against Libya complements other signals of dissatisfaction that the Administration has been sending the Soviets.

The Gulf of Sidra opportunity occurred under optimal circumstances. It is not over. Kadafi, who cannot confront the United States militarily, has called for a campaign against Americans abroad. When Kadafi strikes, will the United States respond? Suppose it can’t be proved that he is the culprit? Suppose his friends in Damascus or Tehran act for him? The United States won’t strike them. The political cost would be too high.

It is generally recognized that behind the ritual Arab support for Kadafi is private applause for the United States. Nonetheless, the timing was bad from the Arab perspective. The conservative gulf states, threatened anew by Iran’s latest offensive, had hoped to use a recent Arab League conference to muster a consensus to support Iraq. Instead, the Gulf of Sidra dominated the proceedings.

Had things gone differently, Kadafi would be a hero now. If the United States had lost a plane or pilot, he would have scored an immediate victory.

But, so far, more has been gained than lost in the Gulf of Sidra. Ignore the bravado. The confrontation has weakened Kadafi. No army likes a losing adventure, and even the general population catches on eventually. Kadafi recognizes his vulnerability; so do his neighbors. They will try to exploit new opportunities to be rid of him. For a while Kadafi will adopt a conciliatory stance toward them, including Egypt--one boon from the confrontation.

There are no easy answers to terrorism. Both passivity and belligerence can prompt more terror. This is only the first round. Much depends on the next round.

The lesson of Tehran was an old one--weakness breeds contempt. The Gulf of Sidra is premised on the notion that power deployed with prudence and caution will help restore what has been lost over the years. It is not an easy policy to execute. Americans, however, are weary of theold one.