Marcos Used Military as Private Army : Documents, Officers Tell of Deployment to Protect Friends

For more than a decade, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos ran the powerful Philippine armed forces as if they were his private army, deploying millions of dollars worth of U.S.-financed military hardware and thousands of combat soldiers to protect his family and friends, according to top Philippine military commanders and declassified documents.

The men and materiel should have been used to protect the Filipino people from a burgeoning Communist insurgency that has claimed thousands of civilian lives nationwide, the commanders said.

The Marcos government also used nearly $100 million in American military aid--a full one-third of all U.S. military assistance to the Philippines between 1979 and 1984--to buy luxury helicopters and other supplies inappropriate for combatting a guerrilla insurgency.

Much of that equipment, the military sources say and documents show, was bought through contracts that benefited individuals in Marcos’ family and government, under a procurement system rife with kickbacks, bribery and overpricing.

Rebels Gained Strength

The military commanders say that misuse of their resources was heaviest during the last five years of the Marcos regime, a time when the bloody rebellion by the Communist New People’s Army grew from a few thousand ragtag rebel fighters to the well-trained guerrilla force of about 15,000 heavily armed regulars now active in every Philippine province.

At the same time, the government troops fighting the rebels in the mountain jungles were running short of virtually all basic combat materials--from ammunition and uniforms to water canteens and daily food rations. A morale crisis arose that military leaders now say was a direct result of “gross mismanagement” of military funds and equipment under Marcos.

“Many of our men do not even have jungle packs or combat boots; instead they are using jute rice sacks and wearing used tennis shoes they had to buy with their own money,” said Gen. Antonio Lukban, who is now in charge of logistics for the entire 200,000-man Philippine armed forces.

‘Twisted Reasoning’

“It all shows the twisted reasoning of the previous administration--they were so concerned with their own security and the security of their cronies that they never really worried about the security of their nation. And it shows how the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army were able to grow so fast in the rural areas.”

This poorly equipped military is what confronted Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger when he arrived in Manila on Sunday to examine the needs of the Philippine armed forces that Marcos left behind and to assess the future of military aid to a nation that has the largest U.S. military bases outside American territory.

Most of the Philippine commanders interviewed last week said there is no need for an increase in U.S. arms aid, which has been set at $425 million for the five years ending in 1991.

While the generals said they will be asking Weinberger to earmark that aid for items ranging from helicopter gunships and fast naval patrol craft to combat boots and field radios, they added that the greatest challenge facing the military now is one of “reorientation and reorganization after a decade of waste.”

Soldiers Are ‘Best Weapons’

“First and foremost, in our country, the best weapons against insurgency are the people themselves--the soldiers,” Lukban said. “If they know what they are fighting for, they don’t need that much equipment. If you see the enemy, you know they are ill-equipped but have been winning because they know what they are fighting for.

“The key is in the leadership. Under the Marcos regime, our soldiers saw their leaders enjoying a comfortable, luxurious life in the city when they were fighting it out in the mud and saying, ‘What the hell are we fighting for?’ ”

Much of that leadership crisis in the military has abated in the six weeks since Marcos fled the country, according to senior military commanders and dozens of field troops interviewed throughout the country during the last several weeks.

President Corazon Aquino has appointed a respected and reform-minded military leader, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, as chief of staff. Already, Ramos has forced the retirement of dozens of aging generals, redeployed scores of the tanks, helicopters and thousands of soldiers to the areas most affected by the insurgency and ordered reorientation programs for officers who were key members of Marcos’ military command.

Military Strategy Changed

He has changed the entire military strategy for fighting the insurgency. Once code-named “Operation Security” under Marcos, the government’s counterinsurgency effort has been renamed “Operation Protection of the People.” Now it involves a broad-based program to counter the Communists peacefully as well as in combat. For instance, military doctors as well as soldiers have been sent to rural areas.

“One of the biggest tasks, though, has been to put the men and equipment we already have in the places where they are needed the most,” said Col. Alexander Aguirre, who is in charge of overall military operations. “We have had to undo a system in which national security meant security for the First Family.”

One longtime military observer in the Philippines put it even stronger.

In describing the military approach under Marcos and his loyal chief of staff, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, the source said, “The entire armed forces was a private little play game to them to maintain power.

Diverted by Marcos

“The Americans sent them helicopters and armored personnel carriers to fight the Communists, and Marcos and Ver parked them outside the palace. The Americans sent combat gear and ammunition, and it ended up in the hands of some private army of a crony politician who used them to crush Marcos’ enemies while the combat soldiers in the field were using Coke bottles for canteens.”

One example of such diversion of military equipment, according to Lukban and other independent military observers in the Philippines and the United States, was in the deployment of 120 state-of-the-art armored personnel carriers supplied to the Philippine military through U.S. military sales credits during the past three years.

The V-150 carriers were bought through U.S. government loans for $30 million between 1983 and 1985. The armored vehicles were earmarked for protecting military convoys and patrols from rebel ambushes, which have claimed the lives of at least 2,000 soldiers in the last three years alone in rural areas throughout the country.

Yet, according to military logistics documents covering the years during which those ambushes occurred, Marcos had ordered only about 40% of the armored personnel carriers deployed in the countryside where the insurgency was active. The other 60% remained in Manila, either guarding Marcos’ presidential palace or rusting in a nearby military base where they were kept as a contingency to put down street demonstrations against Marcos’ 20-year rule.

Troops Not in Field

Similarly, the documents show that six full battalions representing more than 3,000 soldiers trained for combat against the insurgents were instead ordered to stations in or near the palace, the homes of Gen. Ver and other political and business associates.

Many of those soldiers were assigned to intelligence squads that kept Marcos’ political opponents under constant surveillance, according to documents and officers. Scores of others were made plainclothes bodyguards for the former president’s relatives and friends.

Perhaps the most glaring example of mismanagement, though, was the 1983 acquisition and deployment of combat helicopters, Lukban and the other commanders said.

Bad enough, the officers say, that the helicopter gunships, which have been the military’s workhorse in the fight against the Communist rebels, were deployed to protect the Marcos family and friends. But they cited details of the purchasing process as an illustration of wasteful and possibly corrupt military acquisitions under the Marcos regime.

Different Helicopter Supplier

For years, the military has been using Huey helicopters manufactured by Bell Helicopter Corp. in Texas for airlifting and combat operations. But in 1983, according to the military sources and documents, Marcos personally ordered the purchase of 17 S-76 helicopter gunships and two S-70 civilian helicopters from the Sikorsky Helicopter Division of United Technologies Corp. in Hartford, Conn.

The price of the 19 Sikorsky helicopters was $63.5 million, all of it financed through the U.S. government’s Foreign Military Sales program, according to U.S. government documents on file in Manila.

At the same time, though, Bell was offering the Philippine government 33 Huey helicopters for the same price. Top Philippine air force commanders and U.S. military liaison officials all recommended that the government buy the Bell aircraft, which were much less luxurious but more effective in counterinsurgency operations and more compatible with the rest of the military helicopter fleet.

Against those recommendations, Marcos selected the Sikorskys, which one U.S. military source here described as “sophisticated, VIP luxury transport complete with retractable landing gear and air-conditioned comfort on board.”

‘Bought a Lot of Cadillacs’

“They bought a lot of Cadillacs when they needed a lot more Fords,” the source said.

“I felt the procurement was railroaded,” said Lt. Col. Edwin Abello, who directed foreign military sales, particularly from the United States, from 1978 to 1983.

Abello, who resigned in 1983 and now lives in Bartlett, a Chicago suburb, said that he complained in vain at the time. “They wanted something to transport VIPs, not soldiers,” he said.

In recent interviews, Philippine air force pilots have said they are dissatisfied with the performance of the Sikorskys, which were often used for personal missions of Marcos and his cronies rather than in actual combat.

The local representative for Sikorsky at the time of the purchase was a close friend and golfing partner of Marcos. Military commanders said they believed that Marcos’ decision was “much more political than military.”

The ultimate misfortune, Lukban said, is that the military’s greatest need has been for more helicopters and “here we got half as many for twice the price.”

30 of 86 Operational

According to current inventory records, the Philippine air force now has 86 helicopters, but because of age and shortages of spare parts, fewer than 30 of them are in operation at any time.

Such shortages and maintenance problems have plagued the armed forces in other areas, audit reports show. The reports show that only one-half of the Philippine navy’s 226 vessels and one-third of the air force’s military transport aircraft were in “operational readiness” in June, 1984. They also recorded a 74% shortfall in communications equipment at that time.

Another audit report, dated September, 1984, on the nation’s six C-130 aircraft found that only two of the giant cargo and troop carriers were “mission capable” because of a shortage of spare parts.

Also, the auditors wrote, graft in the C-130 division was so blatant that “some people in the unit have already intimated and unabashedly requested rebates” in the purchase of spare parts and supplies.

‘That Was a General’

“The guy who asked for that was a general,” said retired Col. Billy U. Enerio, who as Abello’s superior, directed international logistics for commercial and foreign procurement from 1980 to 1982. Enerio provided copies of the audit reports.

Such skimming on military contracts was common, Enerio said.

“The split was usually 30-70,” said Enerio, a highly decorated, 26-year veteran who said that he resigned in December, 1984, because he was disgusted with the corruption. “Sometimes it even could be 50-50. That’s 50% for you, 50% for the project.”

Enerio said that fraud was common in military procurement.

‘Ghost Contracts’

“We had several procurements that were ghost contracts,” he said. “The money was paid, but the item was not delivered.”

Marcos and Ver presided over key aspects of most military contracts, officials said. Abello, the retired procurement officer, said that Marcos personally had to approve any contract involving more than 1 million pesos.

“You can just imagine the power and the probability of graft and corruption,” Abello said. “Nothing could move without his approval.”

Enerio, who now works as a security guard near Houston, said Ver set up an informal group of aides within the general headquarters to bypass traditional bidding and procurement procedures on everything from tanks to C-rations, trucks to bunk beds.

“And in almost all transactions there was overpricing, there were anomalies,” he said.

Enerio said that Ver ordered his aides to check every military supplier “to look into who are the members of the board, who are behind the firms, so that they can only give contracts to their friends, to the friends of the administration.”

Money Changed Hands

Money often changed hands, he added.

“I was approached by people offering me money,” he said. “There were several times I was approached by businessmen complaining their papers were supposedly lost. But they were not lost. . . . Someone was waiting for a bribe.”

In a 1981 case, military procurement officers issued a contract to buy 500 Isuzu 2 1/2-ton cargo trucks from a local distributor so that spare parts would be available for the popular Japanese truck, Enerio said. Three years later, he added, Ver still had not signed the contract.

But in October, 1984, Enerio said, the military bought 180 of the trucks at a higher price from a company called JARCI that was controlled by Ver. Another 38 trucks were purchased at still a higher price from a woman who claimed that she was Marcos’ cousin, Enerio said.

‘I’m Sick, Sick of This’

“What can we do if she is a relative of Marcos?” Enerio asked. “That’s when I said, ‘I’ve had enough--I’m sick, sick of this.”’

Beyond such specific instances, Lukban and other commanders said, was the overall budget made available by Marcos’ government to the military during a crucial period when many believe that the Communist insurgency could have been contained.

“There simply was not enough money in the budget for us to buy our soldiers uniforms,” said Col. Aguirre. “And the 2,500 pesos (about $125) the government did give each soldier as a uniform allowance for a period of five years ran out even more quickly because the uniforms they were forced to buy were grossly substandard.”

The uniforms were manufactured in the Philippines as part of a self-sufficiency program begun by Marcos, but military officials now say that the contract to produce them went to a firm secretly controlled by a high-ranking military officer.

Uniforms Fall Apart

“And even that would not have been so bad if the damn things didn’t fall apart as soon as you picked them up,” said a Western military observer who asked not to be identified by name.

“What many of our men were forced to do,” Lukban added, “is go to the store and buy another uniform with money out of their own pocket.”

Enerio said the military overpaid by “30% to 50%” for uniforms from the official supplier. In November, 1984, alone, according to documents he provided, that company was paid 25 million pesos, or more than $1 million. To evade rules requiring competitive bidding for contracts of over 2 million pesos, each contract totaled 1,999,686 pesos.

“Instead of bidding, it was already procured,” Enerio said. “It did not go through normal channels.”

Enerio said that Gen. Ver set up a company through two of his sons to sell C-rations to the armed forces.

‘Ver Put His Hand In’

“There already was a firm trying to develop this,” Enerio said. “It was a good product, and we were sending it to our troops. Knowing this was a very lucrative business, and we need a lot of it, Ver put his hand in.”

Officials said that Ver also directed multimillion-dollar contracts to friends for military freight-forwarding and for shoddy steel bunk beds.

“They (the beds) fell apart,” Enerio recalled.

The shortages in the field resulting from such practices led to military abuses that helped to fuel the insurgency. Hungry soldiers stole food from peasant farmers, giving grist to the insurgents propaganda campaign that government soldiers were the enemies of the people. Some soldiers sold their rifles and handguns to black market dealers, who resold them to the insurgents.

“You don’t send combat soldiers on patrol without any rations and expect them not to steal chickens,” the Western military source said. “They are going to steal chickens, and that’s not a military abuse. That’s survival.”

U.S. Caution Urged

The independent and Philippine military sources, however, quickly added that the U.S. government must be cautious in its approach to military aid here in the short term. A sudden influx of new materiel--or, worse, they say, U.S. military advisers in the wake of Marcos’ departure--will only serve to push the military away from its current position of supporting the U.S. role here.

“The typical quick-fix way for America to react would be to send in a Special Forces group to help the Philippine military crush the rebellion once and for all,” the Western military analyst said. “That would be the absolutely worse thing they could do.

“There are people already in the armed forces of the Philippines who know how to handle this situation now that they have the logistical and morale capabilities to do so.”

Lukban agreed. Asked whether the military has a shopping list for Weinberger, Lukban said, “No.”

“The logistical situation we are in is truly very sad, but perhaps this is a good lesson for us. Having learned from our own mistakes and our correcting them the painful way, the Philippine armed forces will certainly endeavor on its own to never let it get this far along again.”

Mark Fineman reported from Manila and Bob Drogin from Texas and Illinois.