Arab World’s Silence Refutes the ‘Experts’

The United States struck Libya; 48 hours later, Col. Moammar Kadafi was in trouble.

With near-unanimity the experts had said that it couldn’t happen. Striking Kadafi, they told us, was self-defeating. It would only rally the Libyan people around him and mobilize Arab support behind him. Arab intellectuals said the same. Arabs, they told us, have a peculiar solidarity. No matter how much they despise the fellow, no matter how deserved his demise, U.S. action will only backfire, for they will be obliged to support him and condemn us.

These fallacies were firmly asserted until, with astonishing quickness, the U.S. strike exposed them for myth. Fighting quickly broke out in the Libyan military, and Kadafi fled Tripoli.

Even if he survives the infighting, it has gravely weakened him, leaving him with an army that is divided and unreliable. Even more astonishing is that the rebellion erupted with no concern for its being associated with the U.S. attack. That’s how much Kadafi is hated at home.

The “experts” were misled by their belief that Arabs are somehow less rational than we are. With two fallacies they would deny the Arabs their reason and the United States the means to cope with terrorism.

The fallacy of “domestic support” asserts that no matter how unpopular Kadafi is, no matter how rash his policies are, outside attack will rally support at home, particularly as the American Goliath (Zionist and imperialist) bears down on an Arab David.

Although there is some truth here, there is no Arab exceptionalism when it comes to loyalty. Americans, too, rally around their leader in crisis. The post-mortem, however, comes quickly, and we exact a price for mistakes. So do Arabs. If a leader acts rashly, if he can be shown to be vulnerable, if his countrymen suffer from his actions, sooner or later their anger turns against him for his folly and brutality. The Libyans’ economy is a shambles, and they bristle under a repressive regime. They are long-suffering.

The military calculates most closely. Its navy lost two boats and their crews in March. For what? A line of death in the seamless ocean? They had been ordered to fire at U.S. planes that they had no chance of hitting. They were humiliated because of Kadafi.

An Egyptian friend assured me that most Libyans, and most Arabs, consider Kadafi a fool who has utterly ruined his country. Unlike the “experts,” he welcomes U.S. attacks on Kadafi.

The fallacy of “Arab support” claims that the Arab states will rally around Kadafi. They may detest him more than the United States does, but they must adhere to the imperative of Arab solidarity.

Silence, however, has many voices. That is what we hear from the Arab world now. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries refused to consider Libya’s call for an oil embargo; the Arab League has postponed its “emergency session” another few days. Even the Soviets cut Kadafi loose before the U.S. strike. The Libyan opposition takes heart from Kadafi’s isolation.

Ironically, Kadafi got his strongest support from the main arena of his terrorism--Western Europe. The protests in Europe’s streets underscore the Arab silence. Europeans don’t know Kadafi as well as the Arabs do. And they have subscribed to one more error: the fallacy of causality.

This remains to be tested. Europeans evidently believe that the U.S. strike on Libya was more horrible than Libyan terrorism. Their fear that more terror will follow the U.S. strike is justified; it has already begun. What is not justified is their suggestion that absent the U.S. strike there would be less terror. Ignoring all the incidents that led to the U.S. strike, the Europeans somehow believe that America is the ultimate cause of terror. Why else would public outrage in Germany be so much greater at the U.S. strike on Libya than at the bombing of the Berlin discotheque?

Although history will have to write the ultimate account of the U.S. strike against Kadafi, the repudiation of the first two fallacies gives cause for hope in the short term. It shows the rationality and calculation of the Libyan people and the Arab states. When a loathsome fellow is attacked, they, like the rest of us, welcome it. The terrorists themselves likely are no less calculating; when their losses are high enough, they will change.

Does the U.S. action pave the way for strikes against other terrorist states? No. Kadafi was weak. The other two members of the ungodly trinity of terror--Syria and Iran--are not. There the experts are probably right: Direct U.S. action would be counter-productive.

But let us understand why. It is not because the moderate Arab states possess a mindless solidarity and cannot perceive their own interest that they seem at times to applaud outrageous behavior. Rather, they fear the consequence to themselves of ineffective U.S. action. They are too vulnerable to endure a long war against the terror of strong states. Kadafi was weak enough, and the U.S. action strong enough, that this time the Arabs were ambiguously silent. The “experts” may have heard anger; I heard applause.