U.S. Disavowal of SALT II Gives the Field to Soviets

Ronald Reagan evidently decided to use the Thanksgiving holiday weekend and the Iranian-Nicaraguan scandal as cover for his accelerated repudiation of the SALT II arms-limitation treaty. The consequences will surely be severe.

SALT II was never ratified, but the United States and the Soviet Union did agree on a no-undercut policy whereby each side promised not to take any action that would destroy the treaty.

But on the day after Thanksgiving the 131st B-52 bomber modified to carry air-launched cruise missiles flew to Carswell Air Force Base to joined the Strategic Air Command. That put this country over the SALT II ceiling that limits the sum of the number of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads plus the number of bombers equipped to launch long-range cruise missiles. Pentagon spokesman Robert B. Sims explained the American refusal to dismantle an old Poseidon missile submarine as compensation for the B-52s by saying, “We couldn’t afford to reduce our future deterrent force structure” any further.

The groundwork for the repudiation of SALT II was laid on May 27, 1986, when President Reagan decided that U.S. strategic force levels would be set without reference to the seven-year-old treaty and would be based “on overall U.S. military requirements and the threat we face.”

Reagan’s decision assumes that the threat faced by this country is independent of his own actions. It is not. If this country is not bound by SALT II, the Soviets are free to take retaliatory action. They have observed the missile and warhead ceilings of SALT II, and carried out the rest of their obligations reasonably well, although always at the outer limits permitted by the ambiguities in the agreement. They need no longer do so, and the treaty itself gives some clues to possible Soviet responses.

As the Soviets deployed each new single-warhead SS-25 missile, they dismantled one larger SS-11 missile and its silo. They normally retain older weapons, but destroyed many of them to stay in compliance with SALT II. Now, thanks to Reagan’s latest action, they need no longer retire missiles as new ones are fielded.

The Soviets could take overt steps to increase the number of warheads on their large SS-18 intercontinental missiles. The SS-18 has never been tested with more than the 10 warheads permitted under SALT II, but has the capability to carry at least 14. It could be tested with a full load, giving its designers confidence in its ability to deliver 40% more nuclear explosives than it can today.

The medium-range Backfire bomber is not equipped for in-flight refueling, and Leonid I. Brezhnev pledged as part of SALT II not to outfit it with any devices to extend its range. There is no evidence of any Soviet violation of this pledge, but the Blinder bomber, Backfire’s predecessor, does carry refueling gear. The Soviets now are free to upgrade the Backfire to make it a true intercontinental bomber.

Finally, the Soviets can camouflage and conceal their strategic forces to prevent U.S. reconnaissance satellites from keeping an accurate count of the threat. SALT II prohibits interference with satellites that are the “national technical means of verification,” but if SALT II has been repudiated, the protection that it affords intelligence-gathering is eliminated as well.

None of these Soviet reactions serve U.S. security interests. But Mikhail S. Gorbachev is subtle, and the Soviets are chess players. They have another option available--the worst, from our point of view.

The Soviets need take no retaliatory steps. From the high road they will then be able to point with dismay to the discouraging evidence that we are no longer serious or reliable negotiating partners, while they appropriate the role of faithful adherent of international agreements. They will remind our friends that whatever remained of the attempt at Reykjavik to close the gaps between the two superpowers has been irrevocably destroyed.

The Soviets will be able to use the reactions of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to their advantage. The repudiation of SALT II may contribute to the defeat of the European leaders most sympathetic to Reagan’s other policies. Our leadership of the alliance is already in question because of the Reagan Administration’s blunders and scandals.

A Democratic-controlled Congress may place binding restrictions on the President’s freedom to deploy and develop U.S. strategic forces in all of next year’s appropriation bills. Indeed, an angered Congress may make the restrictions retroactive, forcing a retreat from the Thanksgiving Eve decision.

Time and world opinion are on the Soviet side if they observe the SALT agreements. The Reagan Administration has left itself to twist slowly in the wind; it has forfeited its ability to lead the domestic debate on defense policy while handing its foreign opponents an opportunity to employ weapons, both propaganda and real, that will erode American security everywhere.