Excerpts From Shultz Arms Testimony

Here are excerpts of testimony by Secretary of State George P. Shultz before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Monday:

We have a legitimate interest in better relations with Iran, and the President determined last year that we should respond to approaches from elements in Iran to see whether Iranian leaders were prepared to shift their policies in a more positive direction. . . .

The problems created by recent events were not caused by these purposes, but by the way they were implemented in this one instance and by certain unauthorized actions of officials on whom the President had relied to implement his policy. . . .

President Reagan is a freedom fighter, and the world knows it. And I stand with Ronald Reagan. . . . Let us show the strength of our free institutions by a full investigation of every detail of this Iran episode.

SHULTZ’S POSITION ON THE INITIATIVE:

I conveyed my concerns on many occasions . . . and I don’t think anyone involved in this is under any illusion whatever about my views. . . .

I supported and continue to support . . . the idea of trying to see if we can’t rearrange the furniture a little bit insofar as Iran is concerned. . . .

However, when it comes to the use of arms, I have a different view. But I do believe that it’s a legitimate subject for debate as a policy matter.

SHULTZ’S PART IN THE ARMS SALES:

I knew that arms transfers to Iran were periodically considered after June, 1985, as part of an effort to improve relations with Iran and secure the release of our hostages. There was considerable discussion between Mr. (Robert C.) McFarlane (former national security adviser) and I about that, and at least on one occasion that I distinctly recall, with the President.

I learned . . . in various ways of two proposed transfers (reportedly by Israel) in 1985, but I was never informed. . . . I knew that in December, 1985, following a full-scale discussion of this matter with the President, that we instructed a mission to talk with the Iranians. . . . They were told, on instructions, that we would engage the Iranians in a dialogue if they release our hostages, but that we would not sell them arms. . . .

The subject was reviewed again by the President in a full-scale meeting in January, 1986. This was not a meeting at which an explicit decision was stated. . . . However, I could fairly conclude from the meeting that the point of view that I thought had prevailed in December didn’t seem to be prevailing. . . . I learned in November that a finding was made authorizing, among other things, arms sales, but I was not informed of that finding at the time. . . .

The finding was in January, and I was notified of it about the same time you were notified of it. I did not learn about any transfers of arms during 1986 in a direct way. But, as is always the case, you have bits and pieces of evidence float in. . . .

My knowledge of what took place was sporadic and fragmentary and materially incomplete.

ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC’S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY:

. . . I believe it is correct to say that we do not have a foreign policy in this State Department. The President has a foreign policy. . . . Now, I believe that the conduct, the operational conduct, of diplomatic activity should be lodged in the State Department and, by and large, it is. If there’s a lesson out of all of this, insofar as how things operate are concerned, I think the lesson is that . . . conducting the operational activities out of the NSC (National Security Council) staff is very questionable and shouldn’t be done except in very rare circumstances. . . .

ON THE SECRET INVOLVEMENT OF THE AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON IN THE SALES:

This past weekend, our ambassador in Beirut, Mr. John Kelly, responded to an all-posts directive that we put out. . . . I will read his response: “I met in Washington in July or August, 1986, with Robert McFarlane. . . . Between the dates of Oct. 30 and Nov. 4, 1986, I had numerous conversations with Lt. Col. Oliver North and Richard V. Secord relating to the hostage negotiations with Iran.

“During that period, I received and sent numerous ‘back channel’ messages to and from the White House, Adm. (John M.) Poindexter (then-national security adviser), concerning the hostage negotiations. Those messages were transmitted and received in what is referred to as the ‘privacy channel,’ using CIA communications facilities. In accordance with our standard practice . . . all that message traffic was destroyed thereafter at my direction. . . . I would assume that copies may be available at CIA headquarters or at White House Situation Room.”

. . . I have instructed Ambassador Kelly to return to Washington immediately, bringing with him all records of such activities, to be available to the FBI and other appropriate investigative bodies. I am, to put it mildly, shocked to learn this after the event from an ambassador. . . .

ON KELLY’S FAILURE TO REPORT:

There’s supposed to be a chain of command. It goes from the President to me--not to the National Security Council--to me, and through the assistant secretary by and large to the ambassador. That’s the chain of command. If something comes up that causes an ambassador to go outside that chain of command, there needs to be a good reason.

Now it may be . . . that Ambassador Kelly will say that he was told on the authority of the President that he was supposed to do this and that. And I would think that he would have checked with me to see if that were so. . . .

ON THE DIVERSION OF FUNDS TO THE CONTRAS:

My role in that was zero. I knew nothing about it until it came out, so I don’t have anything that I can contribute to your deliberations on exactly how that came about.

. . . Very clearly it was a mistake to get involved in the illegal arms transfer, er, funds transfer. . . . I don’t know the ins and outs of that . . . but from what I have seen and what the attorney general has said, some things took place that were illegal. And so that’s clearly a mistake.

It’s not only a mistake because it’s illegal, but it has confused the situation insofar as our support for the Nicaraguan resistance is concerned, and unfairly to them. . . .

ON ANY DIVERSION OF PROCEEDS FROM ARMS SALES TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES:

I have no knowledge of that, just as I have no knowledge of any transfer to the Nicaraguan resistance. My warning flag went up once when I heard about an arrangement, that I was told was not any such arrangement, that seemed to suggest there might have been something going, not necessarily to Angola, but to other countries . . . in Africa. But this did not have in mind anything like what seemed to be described or what we’re learning about the contra fund diversion.

ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S REQUEST TO BRUNEI FOR AID FOR THE CONTRAS:

It would not be proper for me to talk about any particular third country, and so I will not do that. . . .

Having said that, let me go on and say, first reminding you that in August, 1985, Congress approved $27 million in humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. . . . At the time, the Congress expressly confirmed that in addition to expending this $27 million, the law did not preclude, quote, ‘ . . . activity of the Department of State to solicit such humanitarian assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.’

So, it was a perfectly proper activity for the Department of State, for me to do that. There’s nothing illegal about it. There’s nothing improper about it. Quite the contrary. It was the policy of the United States. . . .

I had no discussion of this matter with the sultan or anyone else in Brunei. . . . I knew there was a method. There was a way in which a contribution could be made.

Obviously, a country that you go to is probably going to want to do that secretly, and so you have to have a way of doing it, and I knew that there was such a way because we had been discussing the subject and trying to figure out pursuant to the law and in accordance with the law how we might get some funds to people who, at least as far as we could see, were desperately in need of some.