Contras’ Push Fails to Shake Sandinistas

MANAGUA, Nicaragua —  In the six months since the CIA resumed direction of the anti-Sandinista war, the contras have infiltrated thousands of troops into Nicaragua and are trying to build support among the peasants.

According to rebel and diplomatic sources, the contras are better supplied than ever since starting to receive $100 million in U.S. aid last November. They have begun a campaign of economic sabotage and stepped up fighting in several northern and eastern provinces, with rising casualties on both sides.

But even though the war is becoming increasingly costly for the leftist Nicaraguan government in terms of lives and the economy, the contras still pose no serious military threat to the Sandinistas, these sources say.

No Spectacular Assaults

The rebels have launched no spectacular military attacks and no coordinated assaults in separate areas of the country, nor have they penetrated in force the Pacific Coast region where most of the country’s 3 million people live--goals they set for themselves before their new offensive.

“Until the contras do something on the Pacific Coast, the Sandinistas have good reason to believe this is all a sideshow,” a source close to the rebels said in Honduras.

During the two years when economic aid to the contras was officially limited and direct CIA involvement was prohibited by Congress, the rebels stayed close to their base camps in Honduras and engaged in only sporadic fighting. The rebels complained of serious shortages of military supplies, despite the fact that at least $88 million was raised on their behalf by the Reagan Administration from mid-1984 to October, 1986.

Rising Casualties

Now, U.S. and contra officials say, about 11,000 rebels are in Nicaragua and about 2,000 more are preparing to leave their camps and move to infiltrate this country.

Sandinista officials admit that the rebel presence in Nicaragua has increased, but they dispute the numbers. They say there are about 6,000 inside Nicaragua.

“There have never been so many armed counterrevolutionary forces in this zone,” said Wilfredo Bareto, the Sandinista Front’s political chief in Nueva Guinea, a rural area southeast of the capital.

In northern Nicaragua, too, Sandinista soldiers said that they saw more combat in the first three months of this year than in all of 1986. Both sides say that casualties are rising.

“We are doing better than we expected,” said Adolfo Calero, leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the largest armed rebel group.

The contra offensive comes as Central American diplomats are stepping up efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the five-year conflict.

Active Protest Hoped For

Contra leaders say they are fighting for a military victory, but U.S. officials see the military activity as a means of putting pressure on the Sandinistas to negotiate. The Americans are counting on widespread discontent to escalate into active protest when the contras show that they are a real military force.

In the contra base camps in Honduras, signs of CIA quartermastering are evident. Along with new military supplies and mules to carry them, the Americans have brought in computers.

Recent visitors to the camps say the rebels now have “spit and polish,” including a company-size honor guard that greeted Gen. John R. Galvin, head of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama, when he visited the main camp last month.

“They have new fatigues, new hats,” one visitor said, “and they look better fed. They have new weapons that are well-oiled. They have haircuts.”

CIA Has Had Big Role

At least two CIA agents run a command post at the main base camp and a number of others are known to be involved, in Honduras and elsewhere in the region. The Americans assist with strategy, logistics and intelligence analysis.

The CIA has coordinated flights that parachute specially trained contra commandos into Nicaragua on sabotage missions. The paratroopers, according to rebel and diplomatic sources, are among several hundred contras who were trained in demolitions, weaponry and field medicine by the U.S. Special Forces and other instructors in the United States. They are said to be operating in units of five to nine men each.

With a few exceptions, the contras’ sabotage campaign has focused primarily on Nicaragua’s electric power system and on state-run farm cooperatives. Since mid-February, the rebels have blown up 11 pylons supporting electric power lines, blacking out areas near the northern and southern borders for up to a week at a time. But they have not damaged any power stations.

“They’re not ready for a substation yet,” a source close to the contras said. “They need to build up their infrastructure better. Unlike the Salvadoran guerrillas, they have had no infrastructure to call on for at least a year.”

Station an Important Tool

While the contras were staying close to their camps in Honduras, the Sandinistas relocated thousands of peasants in government-controlled areas and increased their political work and intelligence in the countryside. Now the contras must build support among the peasants, on whom they rely for food and for intelligence about government troop movements.

An important tool in the effort to create political support for the contras is Radio Liberacion, a clandestine station that broadcasts daily. Its programming includes anti-Sandinista songs, soap operas and editorials.

The broadcasts are apparently well-received in the countryside, but observers say the contras still do little direct political work with the peasants--things such as holding meetings to explain their cause, something that the leftist guerrillas do in El Salvador.

“The contras don’t have any ideology except the Catholic religion,” a diplomat who follows the contras’ activities said. “They try to convince the people that the Sandinistas have outlawed their church. It’s obviously not true, but it’s a major recruiting idea for the contras--that they’ve got to get rid of the Sandinistas to save their church.”

Co-ops Are a Target

The CIA has been trying to get the contras to stop attacking the farming cooperatives and using land mines--tactics that kill civilians and cause the peasants to fear the rebels.

The contras deny that they use mines, and they say that cooperatives are legitimate targets because they provide logistical and intelligence support for the Sandinistas. The co-ops are usually protected by armed militiamen and even soldiers, but they are populated by civilians. Still, the contras are reluctant to leave them alone.

“They are forts,” said Aristedes Sanchez, another leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force.

Contras killed a Protestant pastor and two other unarmed civilians in an attack this month on the El Rito cooperative in southeastern Nicaragua, according to witnesses in the area.

‘Part of Guerrilla Mentality’

“The greatest animating force in the contra movement is the desire to recover their land,” a diplomatic source said. “Cooperatives become a gut-level target for them. They are symbols of what the Nicaragua Democratic Force is fighting against. . . . Shooting up villages and burning down homes is a stupid tactic. It goes against winning the hearts and minds of the people. But it’s part of the guerrilla mentality.”

Sources close to the contras said that the CIA and the Pentagon provide the contras with military plans; task force commanders are given a list of targets before they enter their assigned zones, the sources said, but have latitude once they are inside.

“We can tell them one thing in Honduras, but 45 days later they’re on their own,” one source said. “There’s no quick and easy cure for the problem.”

The rebels are expected to step up their military operations in June or July, before the U.S. Congress votes on $105 million in additional aid for them that the Reagan Administration is expected to request.

Looking for Press Coverage

Meanwhile, the contras are trying to get more international press coverage--after months of denying reporters access to their camps.

Although their propaganda and military offensives are obviously timed with the congressional debate in mind, sources said the rebels could not have begun any sooner. U.S. officials have been advising the contras not to undertake anything too big too soon, the sources said.

“We mustn’t confuse strategy with headlines,” Sanchez said.

Where the contras have apparently had some success is in shooting down Sandinista helicopters. As has happened in El Salvador, helicopters have given the Sandinista army an important edge over the guerrillas.

5 Copters Reported Down

The contras say they have shot down five Sandinista helicopters since the start of their present offensive. U.S. intelligence analysts say they have “multiple credible reports” that two helicopters were downed, one of them a Soviet-made MI-24 gunship. The Sandinistas deny the reports.

Diplomats say that the Sandinistas have received about 52 Soviet helicopters in the last two years and have just completed negotiations for 12 to 18 more. They say the new aircraft are to make up for recent or expected losses rather than to expand the Sandinista helicopter fleet.

The contras expect to be given U.S.-made Redeye anti-aircraft missiles, paid for out of the final $40-million increment in current aid that Congress released last month, Calero said. The shoulder-fired Redeye is slightly more sophisticated than the Soviet-made SAM-7 that the rebels already have in their arsenal.

With other new anti-aircraft weapons, the contras hope to be able to establish their first forward operating base in Nicaragua, where they could land helicopters to bring in supplies and take out wounded. Calero said that the contras also expect to get a DC-6 cargo plane and two helicopters to add to their tiny air force of two DC-6s (only one is operational), two Spanish-made Casa aircraft and two helicopters.

Military Resupply Improved

One of the contras’ major problems is the evacuation of their wounded. They cannot easily leave the country and have not been able to set up hospitals in Nicaragua.

Sources said that apparently the contras’ ranks are also heavily infiltrated by Sandinistas. This is a longstanding problem, but the contras have broken up into smaller units in the field, and this is said to be helping to limit infiltrators’ access to information.

The CIA reportedly has improved its military resupply operation in recent weeks, but the rebels say they still have a shortage of secure radio equipment. In February, contra sources complained about too few supply flights, but now they say they are receiving three or four airdrops a week in Nicaragua.

Officials of the Nicaraguan Defense Ministry said that their radar detected 34 reconnaissance and resupply flights in March.

Program ‘Going Well’

The Sandinistas have not shot down a contra supply flight since October, when they downed an American-piloted C-123 in southern Nicaragua. Cargo handler Eugene Hasenfus survived the crash and told reporters that he believed that the supply flights from El Salvador and Honduras were being directed by the CIA--at a time when direct CIA involvement was prohibited by Congress.

CIA direction of the program became legal again that same month, when President Reagan signed the $100-million contra aid bill for the current fiscal year. So far, the CIA and the rebels are satisfied with their progress.

“The program is going well,” a diplomatic source said. “It’s on course, where the CIA wanted it to be, with no major setbacks.”

But Sandinista army intelligence chief Capt. Ricardo Wheelock has a different view: “The contras pose no strategic threat to the revolution,” he said.

Times staff writer Richard Boudreaux contributed to this story.