Minutes Link Reagan to Arms Sales Secrecy : Probers Release Notes of White House Meeting Showing He Overruled Top Cabinet Officials

President Reagan led a White House effort to conceal the facts about his secret arms deals with Iran last November, overruling arguments from both Secretary of State George P. Shultz and then-White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan that details of the deals should be disclosed, according to minutes of a White House meeting.

The minutes, part of a two-inch sheaf of documents released last week by Congress’ Iran- contra committees, describe an apparently heated confrontation between the President and Shultz during the meeting last Nov. 10.

By that time reports of the arms shipments to Iran had surfaced publicly, and Reagan met with his top Cabinet and White House staff to discuss how to deal with the controversy.

‘Israelis Suckered Us’

Shultz warned that the scheme had left U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in “(a) state of total disintegration” and noted reports that “the Israelis suckered us” in the arms deals, according to notes taken at the session by Alton G. Keel Jr., then deputy national security adviser.

But Reagan was unmoved--and fought to keep his arms-and-hostages deals going forward, the minutes show. “(The) rumors have endangered what we’re doing (and) endangered our contacts” with Iran, he told Shultz. When an American citizen is taken hostage, he added, “(a) purpose of government is to go to his or her support.”

“I agree (that a) purpose of government is to protect citizens,” Shultz replied, “but (the) whole purpose is to protect (them) by discouraging terrorism.”

Reagan and other top officials made it clear in November that they wanted to keep the details of the arms deals secret, in hopes of winning the release of more of the American hostages held by pro-Iranian terrorists in Lebanon.

In a nationally televised speech three days after the Nov. 10 meeting, for example, Reagan decried “wildly speculative and false stories about arms for hostages and alleged ransom payments,” refused to provide any details of the arms sales, which had already occurr1701063712hostage talks with Iran to continue.

In his congressional testimony last week, Shultz identified the late CIA Director William J. Casey and then-National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter, both of whom attended the Nov. 10 meeting, as his principal opponents in the “battle royal” over White House policy on the issue.

But the handwritten minutes of the meeting show that the President himself was the most forceful proponent of keeping the arms deals going. The minutes thus provide an extraordinary inside look at the clashes at the very top of Reagan’s Administration.

Sought Explanation

Shultz and Regan argued that the weapons shipments had to be explained, and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger joined Shultz in complaining that the negotiations had turned into arms-for-hostage deals without the Cabinet’s being consulted.

But Reagan, supported by Poindexter, Casey and Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III, remained adamant.

“We were getting (the) influence of Iran, not ransom,” he explained to Shultz.

“(I’m) not sure what’s (the) difference,” Shultz shot back, according to Keel’s notes.

The 11:30 a.m. meeting included the President, Vice President George Bush, Chief of Staff Regan, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Poindexter and Keel, according to the notes. The President opened the discussion by saying that a statement was needed from “all of us,” explaining that there had been “no bargaining with terrorists” and that the Administration had acted to foster “hope for (a) moderate government” in Iran.

Reagan Urged Secrecy

But when the participants began discussing what the statement should say, the President insisted that the details of the arms deals had to remain secret. “We don’t talk TOWs, don’t talk specifics,” he said.

According to the minutes, first reported in Sunday’s editions of the Washington Post, Chief of Staff Regan protested that there was still a “need to say something to thinking people (not press).”

But the President repeated: “Avoid specifics, declare (the arms deals) consistent with our policy.”

Regan then asked: “Who will issue Q & A’s?”--a reference to the fact sheets often provided to reporters by the White House.

The President, Meese and Casey all answered at once, according to the minutes: “No Q & A’s.”

The discussion followed a review of the history of the arms sales by Poindexter, who delivered a wildly misleading portrait of the operation--apparently because he wanted to continue concealing large parts of it from Shultz and Weinberger, who largely had been kept in the dark.

Three Shipments Cited

The notes indicate that Poindexter mentioned only three weapons shipments to Iran, one in 1985 and two in 1986, when in fact there were five shipments. He said the United States had sold a total of 1,000 TOWs to Iran, when the correct total was 2,008. He said Israel had shipped the first 500 TOWs “without permission,” when in fact Israel had been given explicit permission by then-National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane. And he failed to mention several episodes that later proved troublesome, like the CIA’s potentially illegal involvement in one of the shipments.

Shultz and Weinberger responded bluntly to Poindexter’s account, the minutes show.

“I thought we agreed no more after first 500 (TOWs), unless (we) got all captives,” Weinberger was quoted as saying, referring to a decision Reagan made in December, 1985, to halt the arms deals.

Poindexter replied that he “just always came back to Pres, he agreed to go forward,” the notes show.

‘Weapons for Hostages’

Shultz complained that the deals did make it appear that the United States “gave weapons for hostages.”

And he said he was “concerned” that some accounts suggested “that (the) Israelis suckered us so they could sell what they want” to Iran.

“Do we trade any more arms for hostages?” he asked.

Reagan, according to the notes, did not answer the question. Instead, he said pointedly: “Appreciate people saying you support policy.”

Meese agreed, the notes show.

“I support you, Mr. President,” Shultz said. “But (I’m) more concerned about policy.”