$270 Million for Contras--a Political Surprise Not Fully Unwrapped

Last week Secretary of State George P. Shultz surprised Congress by proposing another $270 million for the contras fighting in Nicaragua. This was the first word that the Administration wants to increase its investment in the key instrument of its Central American policy. It also sowed confusion about the course of U.S. policy.

The new money would be spent over an 18-month period at the rate of $180 million a year, up from the $100-million rate in the appropriation that will expire Sept. 30. Rather than seeing the contras as a failed effort to force decisive change in the Sandinista regime, the Reagan Administration seems as chipper as ever about the prospects for the “freedom fighters.”

Or is it? As is so often true with announcements about intentions, timing is important. Sept. 30 is one important date, but so is Nov. 7. That is the day on which the test will formally begin of the plan signed last month by the leaders of the five Central American countries. This plan, named after Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, calls for a cease-fire, an end to U.S. aid for the contras, and--on Nicaragua’s part--movement toward democracy.

The Arias plan is a package deal, but it is loosely put together, and President Reagan has characterized it as fatally flawed. While it clearly requires an end to all military pressure on the Sandinistas, what Nicaragua must do is murky, subject to interpretation, and a pudding that can be proved only after a lengthy period. There is no assurance that the Sandinista regime will transform itself, politically, to the point at which it will stop promoting revolution in neighboring states or serving as a cat’s paw for the Cubans and the Soviets.

The Administration didn’t want to countenance the negotiating process. The President embraced a peace plan put forward by the Speaker of the House, Jim Wright. Reagan thus showed that he could reach out to Congress and the Democrats, but he ran little risk that Nicaragua would go along. His hand was forced, however, when, in response to the Reagan-Wright initiative, the Central American presidents signed the Arias plan. Suddenly the Administration faced a peace process that it could neither contest nor control.

Shultz’s presentation to Congress on new contra aid thus seems to be a straightforward bid to sustain some leverage over the Sandinistas. That reflects common carrot-and-stick, or bargaining-chip, theory. But something has to be different here. It is hard to believe that Congress will appropriate new money for the contras in the amounts specified, and certainly not unless Comandante Daniel Ortega and his colleagues clearly flout all their pledges of pluralism--something that can’t be judged until after Nov. 7. Nor are the Sandinistas ignorant of Congress’ reluctance to grant the Reagan Administration request.

The explanation for the request, especially of its size, must therefore lie less in bargaining tactics than in U.S. domestic politics and processes. In general, Administrations don’t like to admit mistakes or change course. Trying to keep the contras going is the line of least resistance. It also helps to obscure the difficult moral issue that will arise if and when the United States abandons people who have put faith in its commitment, however foolhardy that may have been. Also, despite the rhetoric on Capitol Hill, it will be difficult for Congress to refuse all aid for the contras, thereby defying a determined President. The euphemism humanitarian may be used to cover a dribble of funds in the new fiscal year.

At this point speculation begins. The aid request can serve one of two broad purposes. Reagan may have determined to accept a settlement in Nicaragua on the best terms that he can get. These could include an end to foreign military bases and advisers, limits on the size of the Nicaraguan armed forces, and pledges not to subvert neighboring countries. These are basic U.S. security interests, and this is the course of statesmanship. If this is Reagan’s choice, then asking for money, however ill-timed and ill-starred the request may be, is a sop to conservatives before a major shift in policy.

By contrast, the President may simply be preparing to dig in his heels, win or lose. Should the tactic not work in negotiations over the Arias plan, the issue of the Sandinistas and Central American security will almost surely carry over to the next Administration and Congress. It will continue to fester in U.S. politics. And the naysayers, the opponents of the new contra money, will be targeted for political attack. The Republican right already sees electoral opportunity in this course.

Ronald Reagan is nothing in politics if not a master of suspense. The denouement that he chooses--to craft a settlement in Central America or to create a cudgel for right-wing politicians--will define to a great degree the legacy that he leaves the nation.