Improving the Ties That Can Bind : At This Summit the Promise Could Well Be in the Linkage

If summit meetings may be seen as railroad stations marking advances in the track along which the train of superpower relations runs, what kind of progress will next week’s Moscow summit reflect?

As far as arms control is concerned, the underlying dynamic of the process is perhaps more noteworthy than its products. The intermediate-range nuclear-forces deal, the progress on cuts in strategic arsenals and the steady narrowing of differences over the SDI/ABM nexus all testify to a significant convergence of superpower interests in this area.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are looking for ways to reduce the burden of spiraling arms competition. In Washington and Moscow alike, economic imperatives largely drive arms control. Economic motives are particularly strong in the Soviet case. Mikhail S. Gorbachev appreciates, to a far greater degree than his predecessors, the need to escape from the straitjacket of military competition with the United States so as to free resources for the civilian development that lies at the heart of the whole perestroika enterprise. This means changing the nature of superpower relations from tense confrontational stand-off to more cooperative lower-key competition in which he calculates that Moscow could perform better and possibly achieve the global political equality with Washington that military parity has failed to deliver. By pursuing an unusually active and flexible policy of diplomatic engagement with the United States, Gorbachev has made some headway toward reducing the confrontational atmosphere.

Washington has seen an unprecedented flow of visitors from Moscow who have greatly softened elite as well as public images of the Soviet threat. Gorbachev has spent considerable time not just with President Reagan and other leading members of his Administration but also with numerous groups from Congress. Both leaderships now have a far more sophisticated image and understanding of one another.

But while atmospherics have improved and dialogue is less ideological, many of the old strains and conflicts continue to surface. The Soviets remain sensitive to what they call “sermons” on humanitarian issues. Discussions about human rights are more open than ever, yet the actual fruit of Soviet “liberalizing” reforms remains to be seen.

Given that problems of human rights and basic values are likely to bedevil superpower relations for the foreseeable future, it is important that Washington and Moscow build on major linkages that are more readily capable of stabilizing their relationship. Economic ties offer considerable potential here.

The Soviets are very keen to interact more closely with the United States economically, to give the overall relationship more ballast. They are eager to promote more two-way trade and, if possible, some joint ventures. From an American business standpoint there is little incentive to respond. So far American corporations are involved in only two of the 33 joint ventures that the Soviets have signed. Trade is on the rise, but prospects of substantial growth remain slim as long as Moscow has so little to offer in the way of marketable goods.

As far as the Third World linkage of superpower relations is concerned, Moscow does have what Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze has described as a really marketable product--the “new thinking,” a more cooperative and political approach to regional conflicts than the traditional one of confrontation and use of military force. The change of policy concerning Afghanistan is symptomatic of a more cautious Third World policy. Since Washington shares Moscow’s new-found appreciation of the intractability and dangers of regional conflict, current discussions on drawing up basic ground rules of superpower involvement and management may prove more fruitful than in the 1970s. The summit will be an occasion to review and perhaps speed up the slow progress on the broad regional front and the more encouraging recent discussions on the Middle East and Southern Africa.

As always, however, pride of place will be given to arms control--the perennial touchstone of progress in superpower relations. Doubtless we shall have a communique on the state of play concerning a strategic-arms-reduction treaty. Yet the speed with which an agreement is reached here seems less important than its quality. Indeed, from a West European perspective it would be reassuring if Moscow and Washington concentrated on qualitative rather than quantitative arms control.

It is not making a parochial European point to stress that reductions in superpower nuclear arsenals cannot substitute for tackling conventional imbalances. But so far Washington has shown less interest than the West Europeans, notably the Germans, in the apparent Soviet willingness to explore data exchanges and asymmetrical reductions to levels sufficient for defensive operations.

If the Moscow summit meeting proves to be less exciting than previous Reagan-Gorbachev sessions, this should be taken as a cause for reassurance rather than concern. “Making haste slowly” seems to be the best way to consolidate and build on the marked improvement in the quality of superpower dialogue and relations achieved during the last three years.