Noriega Tightens Control With New Military Council

With the creation of an inner circle command that puts his nearest military rivals on the sidelines, Gen. Manuel A. Noriega has significantly strengthened his control over Panama’s all-powerful armed forces, diplomats and foreign and local military experts say.

The parallel command group is called the Strategic Military Council, and Noriega has endowed it with the kind of powers previously associated with the functions of his general staff, which is normally the armed forces’ highest decision-making body.

But Noriega’s general staff includes several colonels who are reported to be unhappy with his continued hold on power, foreign observers say. Noriega distrusts the colonels, especially Col. Elias Castillo, who is occasionally mentioned as a potential successor to the general.

On the other hand, the Strategic Military Council is mostly made up of hand-picked, middle-ranking officers who are noted for their loyalty to Noriega.

Only one colonel is included on the council, and he was recently promoted by Noriega; three lieutenant colonels, 10 majors and six captains make up the rest. Captains and majors are said to form the backbone of Noriega’s support in Panama’s Defense Forces.

“The general staff has been gutted of power. It is now ornamental,” said a Western military observer who closely follows shifts of personnel in the Defense Forces.

“It is the council that commands the armed forces,” said Ivan Romero, a spokesman for the Christian Democratic Party, which opposes military rule.

Control of the military is key to holding political power in Panama. The armed forces overthrew a civilian government elected in 1968 and have ruled both overtly and from behind the scenes ever since.

At His Behest

Civilian presidents come and go at the pleasure of Noriega, who has headed the Defense Forces for almost five years. The latest conflict between Noriega and a civilian chief of state, President Eric A. Delvalle, ended with Delvalle’s ouster three months ago.

Delvalle had tried to fire Noriega, but in Panama, it works the other way.

Delvalle’s downfall triggered widespread outbursts of protests by opposition groups. The United States, which is pursuing Noriega on drug-trafficking charges, imposed a series of punishing economic sanctions on Panama in response to Delvalle’s departure.

But Noriega has held tightly to power. He has survived street demonstrations and the deteriorating economy and now, with the creation of the 20-member Strategic Military Council, he appears to have fortified his base of power.

Base of Future Influence

At the least, Noriega has prepared a base of future influence should he ever retire from the Defense Forces. If he decides to stay on indefinitely, he has created a structure that protects him from opponents within the armed forces.

“Although there is still a risk of friction within the armed forces and especially from the general staff, Noriega appears to have the pieces in place to keep power,” said a U.S. diplomat.

Such an opinion is bad news for the Reagan Administration, which still harbors hopes that the Panamanian military itself will overthrow Noriega. No other force inside the country is considered to have the strength to oust the entrenched ruler.

Noriega has long commanded the 15,000-member Panamanian armed force by consistently bypassing the normal military hierarchy. Former associates say he frequently gives orders directly to captains and majors, who in Panama actually command the troops while colonels generally hold the desk jobs.

However, until now, the technique was never formalized.

Own Network

“This is nothing new, in the sense that Noriega has always run things through his own network of officers. The method is simply set in stone through the council,” said a Western miliary observer.

The council, formed May 13, is empowered to handle all aspects of national security, including war-making decisions and the gathering of intelligence.

It also has been given powers designed to subdue domestic unrest. The council is charged with maintaining government activities in the event of a national emergency. According to a military communique, it also is intended to “evaluate and attend to” labor walkouts that might threaten national stability.

Perhaps most pointedly, the council will investigate “crimes of treason . . . committed by members of the armed forces.”

Coup Attempt

This power evidently is a response to a March 16 coup attempt against Noriega. The barracks coup failed but the rebellion revealed deep splits in the military.

Since the coup attempt, Noriega has taken several steps to prevent a repeat. He placed the leaders of the coup, including then-police chief Col. Leonidas Macias, under arrest and fired his top intelligence officers for not having predicted the rebellion, Western military observers say.

Noriega then approved numerous promotions, not only of his supporters but also of neutral officers to answer complaints that promotions had been held up or reserved strictly for the general’s favorites.

He dismissed a chief rival, Col. Eduardo Herrera, the country’s ambassador to Israel. Herrera, because of his seniority, would have been in line to succeed Noriega if normal retirement schedules were followed.

Neutralized Opposition

Finally, with the creation of the Strategic Military Council, Noriega neutralized colonels directly under his command who might consider trying to oust him.

The highest-ranking officer on the council is Col. Rogelio Alba, who was promoted to colonel after the coup. Alba is the Panamanian representative on a joint U.S.-Panama committee that oversees military cooperation at the Panama Canal.

Several other officers on the council are involved in day-to-day operations at the canal, leading military observers to conclude that Noriega is especially interested in preserving a tight military presence at the strategic waterway.

Panama is scheduled to gain full operating control of the canal and to assume full responsibility for its defense by the year 2000. Many Panamanians and U.S. observers speculate that the Defense Forces will not only take over the canal’s defense, as scheduled, but will also be assigned to operate the waterway as one of the military’s many sources of income.

In Panama, the military is in charge not only of defense but the police and customs services. The Defense Forces also controls numerous businesses in Panama. It operates a separate freight forwarding service at the free trade zone in Colon that collects fees for the movement of goods through the facility. It also owns a share of the national airlines, a television station and interests in liquor sales and, reportedly, prostitution.

Such wide-ranging business interests have made it possible for the armed forces to supplement their income and insulate themselves from budget restraints. High-ranking officers can look forward to a comfortable career and retirement. The pay of lower-ranking officers is supplemented by the outside income.

“One of the things that makes it difficult to break military unity is that they enjoy special benefits,” said a Latin diplomat. “In the future, the canal can contribute to their well being.”