Marcos: Safe Haven?

If his were ordinary crimes, former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos would have been indicted long ago. Federal prosecutors in New York have constructed what one calls a “dead-bang” case of conspiracy and fraud against the one-time dictator and his wife, Imelda. Prosecutors uncovered an elaborate paper trail making clear that the Marcoses used millions of dollars in Philippine government funds to purchase New York City real estate and then schemed to conceal their ownership and to evade U.S. taxes. The Marcoses allegedly enlisted international arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi to help them shield their properties from the current Philippine government, which for two years has been trying to identify and recover the Marcoses’ assets.

Fortunately, the Reagan Administration has recognized, perhaps belatedly, that no prosecution of a foreign head of state, even a former head of state like Marcos, can be classified as ordinary. After the Justice Department approved the indictments of Panamanian strongman Manuel A. Noriega without consulting the White House, President Reagan and his aides let it be known that they wanted final approval over such moves. So this time it will be up to Reagan to decide whether to let U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani proceed with the indictment of the Marcoses. Reagan is to be briefed about the case this week, just as the five-year statute of limitations on some of the Marcoses’ alleged crimes expires.

If the interests of justice were the only consideration, we would recommend that the President approve the indictments. Laws lose their meaning if they are not enforced, and U.S. tradition dictates that everyone, including former heads of state, is equal before the law. Diplomatic pressures for the indictments are also building. Marcos’ successor, President Corazon Aquino, has signaled that she wants the former strongman indicted. The State Department, pleased that Aquino’s government has backed away from its demands for a huge increase in compensation for the U.S. military bases in the Philippines, has reportedly approved the indictments.

But there are countervailing considerations, too. Before the President makes up his mind, we would urge him to recall the assurances that his government gave when Marcos was persuaded to leave his besieged palace in February, 1986, and go into exile. In his final hours in Manila, Marcos called Reagan’s friend, Sen. Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.), and made it clear that he would leave only if there were assurances that he, his family and his associates would be spared “vindictiveness or revenge” or “congressional harassment,” as Laxalt later said.

The United States didn’t explicitly promise Marcos that he would never be prosecuted--no contracts were drafted--and Marcos has since complained that he was essentially kidnaped by U.S. forces from the palace. But it seems to us that the record shows that, whatever his later bitterness, the prospect of a safe haven induced Marcos and his family to fly from the Philippines to Guam and then on to Hawaii, where they still live in exile. And a safe haven at least implies freedom from federal prosecution, if not from the civil suits that have already been filed by the Philippines against Marcos.

Reagan should also consider whether reneging on an implied promise to Marcos would make it harder for the United States to persuade other dictators to step aside. By leaving Manila peacefully, Marcos helped avert what could have been a bloodbath and allowed a government friendly to Washington to come to power. Earlier that month the United States had used the same approach to coax Haitian President-for-Life Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier into exile. The same method might have worked, too, with Noriega--but for the indictments. The lesson that we would draw from all this is that indicting a head of state may satisfy some thirst for revenge, may comport with the American sense of justice, but does not necessarily work to the ultimate benefit of the United States.