Bush Aides Drafting New Nicaragua Policy Options

In a move to revive U.S. influence in Central America and boost chances of new military aid for the Nicaraguan rebels, aides to President-elect George Bush are working on a new initiative in the area that may include direct talks between the United States and the Sandinistas for the first time in four years.

Several Bush aides, a variety of putative office-seekers and rival leaders among the Contras themselves are all drafting proposals for a policy that the new President can follow, once he inherits the problems of Central America on inauguration day, officials said.

The literary gold rush has been stimulated by the fact that, while everyone agrees Bush must do something about Nicaragua, the President-elect has made no clear decision yet on what that something will be.

“We’ve got a whole stackful of papers,” a Bush transition aide said. “But we haven’t done anything with them yet. . . . There’s no brain in the transition that can make those decisions.”

Bush has said that he plans to continue seeking President Reagan’s basic goals in Central America, but he has not said how. “I will press to keep the pressure on the Sandinistas to keep their commitment . . . to democracy and freedom,” he said last week.

Still, all of those working on policy proposals seem to agree on a few fundamentals: the Reagan Administration’s attempts to win military aid for the Contras are paralyzed; the current attempt to negotiate a peaceful end to Nicaragua’s insurgency has failed, and, unless the new Administration can come up with something fresh, both the Contras and U.S. policy in the area are headed for collapse.

Congress, which provided more than $200 million to the Contras from 1981 through 1987, has refused further military aid since last February.

Most of the proposals reportedly suggest that the Bush Administration launch an early diplomatic initiative to engage the Sandinistas in renewed negotiations, press U.S. demands for increased democracy in Nicaragua and then ask Congress for renewed military aid to the Contras--”in the context of supporting the negotiations,” one official said.

Initiatives Differ

But they differ on several key issues, including whether the United States should talk directly to the Managua regime as part of the initiative. The Reagan Administration talked with the Sandinistas in 1984 and 1985 but broke off the negotiations amid mutual accusations of bad faith.

“If part of what we’re trying to do is demonstrate that we’re serious about negotiations, it would probably be a good idea to hold a meeting or two with the Sandinistas,” said a Reagan Administration official who has been working on one of the draft proposals. “Nothing high level, just something to open a channel of communication.”

But other Bush advisers have said they see no need for direct talks with the Sandinistas. “It would only complicate what is supposed to be a regional process,” said Richard Haass, a foreign policy adviser to the Bush campaign.

7 Separate Proposals

According to Bush aides and Reagan Administration officials, at least seven separate proposals for Central America are at various stages of completion. They include one being prepared by Samuel J. Watson III, a foreign policy aide on Bush’s vice presidential staff; another by William Perry, a former National Security Council aide who worked on the Bush campaign, and one from Haass, a former State Department official now teaching at Harvard University.

All three call for a new diplomatic attempt to force the Sandinistas to move toward increased internal democracy and a cease-fire deal with the Contras; all three assume that the Sandinistas will resist, and that the Administration will then ask Congress for military aid.

Haass’ proposal has drawn fire from some hard-line conservatives because it openly raises the possibility that the Bush Administration might turn to a policy of “containment”--building up the armies of the U.S. allies around Nicaragua--if Congress refuses to help the rebels. But Haass has said he considers containment only a last resort.

‘Give Diplomacy a Chance’

“I don’t like containment,” he said. “It’s ultimately available as an alternative, but no one should underestimate its costs and drawbacks. . . . The better alternative is to give diplomacy a chance, so as to take away the argument from those who charge that we never have.”

The proposals also differ on how soon Congress should be pressed to vote on Contra aid again. Perry favors seeking an up-or-down vote on aid within six weeks, “to force them (the Democrats) to confront the reality that they will be responsible for losing Central America,” an official said. A draft proposal in Watson’s office called for a longer period of negotiations--three to six months--before a vote on Contra aid, a knowledgeable official said.

The picture is complicated by reports that all three men are being considered for jobs in the new Administration, including the key post of assistant secretary of state for Latin America. “Sometimes these papers are really job applications in disguise,” a Senate aide noted.

Abrams Offering Plan

Meanwhile, the current assistant secretary for Latin America, Elliott Abrams, is writing his own proposal for a future policy in Central America (although Abrams has told associates that he does not want a job in the new Administration). A private human rights organization, Freedom House, has issued a paper calling for more pressure on the Sandinistas to make their domestic political system democratic. And the Contras, themselves riven by internal disputes, are reportedly preparing at least two--and perhaps more--wish lists of their own.

The Contras, their troop strength reduced to fewer than 7,000, say that they desperately need a clear policy from the new Administration to maintain their fight. But they have been unable to agree among themselves on a strategy.

One faction, led by a relative moderate, Alfredo Cesar, has argued for a serious attempt to negotiate peace with the Sandinistas. But a hard-line faction including conservative politician Adolfo Calero has prepared a proposal for negotiations that are apparently intended to fail.

“We are asking for a total amnesty, a national dialogue and the integration of our forces into a national army,” a Calero aide said. “It’s a proposal that the Sandinistas are certain to refuse.”