Ending the Carnage in Cambodia by a Coalition of Outside Interests

WASHINGTON —  Can a mix of international cooperation, great power diplomacy and well-crafted political constraints prevent yet another Cambodian tragedy? The departure of about 50,000 Vietnamese troops from Cambodia gives this question new urgency. For even as the pieces of a settlement begin to fall into place, the nasty reality of Vietnamese occupation will be replaced by a still more horrendous dilemma: How to prevent the murderous Khmer Rouge from returning to power while creating a Cambodia in which non-communist Cambodians can thrive?

Hanoi’s decision to retreat is a conspicuous sign that a new geopolitical calculus in Southeast Asia is bringing resolution of a decade-long conflict within sight. What makes this environment of accommodation possible, however, are the self-interested desires among external actors--to be rid of the Cambodian problem. Unfortunately, their least important consideration seems to be the interests of the Cambodian people.

Sino-Soviet rapprochement has led Moscow to press Vietnam to withdraw and China to consider a cutoff of its lavish aid to the Khmer Rouge. Diplomatic and economic pressures on Vietnam by the Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations and the United States, plus the resolve of the Khmer resistance, have led Hanoi to redefine its short-term goals in Cambodia. For ASEAN, Cambodia is a running sore, one that conveniently hobbles Vietnam yet also threatens regional stability--and is therefore bad for business.

This convergence of national interests looms behind a complex web of diplomacy that has made the broad outlines of a settlement discernible. As always, however, the devil is in the details. Just getting past a host of procedural sticking points is no small task. There is no firm timetable for the exit of about 70,000 remaining Vietnamese troops. China has demanded that any cutoff of external aid to all factions be linked to such a timetable. And Vietnam has thus far opposed the idea of a U.N. peacekeeping force, the essential insurance policy of an accord. While all agree that Prince Norodom Sihanouk should head a new coalition government (of four factions--including the Khmer Rouge), when and how to phase out the present Phnom Penh regime remains an unanswered question, not to mention how such an unwieldy coalition creature would function.

Why include the Khmer Rouge in a settlement? The hard reality is that having fought the overwhelming majority of the battles against the Vietnamese, they cannot be ignored. The exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from a settlement, Sihanouk has pointed out, would guarantee civil war. Better to include a politically decapitated and isolated Khmer Rouge (exiling its top leaders has to be a provision of any agreement).

The Khmer Rouge would like the world to believe they are born-again social democrats. By offering to support the reconciliation process and contribute 10,000 guerrillas to a national army, the Khmer Rouge are saying in effect, “Stop me before I kill again.” But loopholes--in their proposal and their behavior--belie their rhetoric. What would become of the 25,000 remaining Khmer Rouge guerrillas? There is no indication of good faith. In recent months, the Khmer Rouge have spent more time attacking Sihanouk forces than they have the Vietnamese.

Moreover, they have run secluded, tightly controlled refugee camps in Thailand much like the society they ran in Cambodia while in power. Last fall they forcibly moved 15,000 refugees across the border in an effort to establish secure bases from which they could later expand into the Cambodia interior.

Beyond the mortal Khmer Rouge threat, a Sihanouk-led coalition would have to contend with the People’s Republic of Kampuchea regime, which is busily putting into place its own political and administrative infrastructure. The PRK may be nationalists but they are also Marxists (many former Khmer Rouge) who are in power only because of Moscow and Hanoi support. Yet a fusion of Sihanoukists with the PRK apparatus may be the best-case scenario. It is just possible that such a coalition might work. Already, there is quiet cooperation between PRK and Sihanouk forces in the field. Ideology aside, the PRK has allowed a fair amount of free-market activity--if only because of its limited capabilities. Given Cambodia’s need for international aid and for integration into the region--and hence for legitimacy--the PRK would have powerful incentives for working with Sihanouk.

But any such fragile working arrangement would require careful nurturing by the key players shaping Cambodia’s fate. With the possible exception of the United States, however, all outside players are far more concerned with removing Cambodia as a source of tension than with the fate of 5 million Cambodians.

With limited influence, the United States cannot play more than a support or catalytic role. But American moral and political clout could make a difference if the Bush Administration, with bipartisan support, takes a more activist stance in helping shape a political process to limit Khmer Rouge influence and enhance Sihanouk’s prospects. There are three main elements in such a process, all of which need vigorous U.S. endorsement and continued high-level attention:

-- A preliminary conference called by ASEAN or France (including the United States, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China) to frame the political underpinnings for settlement. This would be followed by an international conference under U.N. auspices to work out the specifics of a transition: a timetable for Vietnamese withdrawal; a parallel cutoff of aid to all factions; the composition of an interim government, and the ousting of top Khmer Rouge leaders.

-- A U.N. peacekeeping force. This group should have Asian credibility, be neutral, be able to defend territory and operate in Cambodian conditions. The best choice would be the Gurkhas, a Nepalese legacy of British empire that meets all the requirements. There are about 7,500 Gurkhas, reputedly fine jungle fighters, most stationed in Hong Kong and in search of a new mission. They could be supplemented by a civilian monitoring commission with ASEAN or other Asian members. Such a force would likely need to be in place from three to five years; Japan could lend financial support.

-- International aid. France should lead an aid consortium and the United States should contribute toward a $100-million emergency package, with Europe, the Soviets, Japan and others also contributing. The fund would provide Sihanouk with the means to train Cambodians in an array of skills needed to administer a government and rebuild the economy. This would be the first installment of a reconstruction fund to be ultimately administered by the World Bank when a relativel stable permanent government has been firmly established.

None of these elements can guarantee that the Khmer Rouge will disappear or that a pluralist Cambodia will emerge. But if implemented they could create a political and economic dynamic that could relegate residual Khmer Rouge forces to pockets of influence in rural areas that, under military pressure, would dwindle over time. The alternative to such an initiative is too ghastly to contemplate.