Airport Security Still Needs to Be Improved

As investigators continue to examine clues and inspect evidence in the explosion and crash of Pan Am Flight 103, some tough questions about airport and airline security have been raised.

How did the bomb get on the plane? Where was it boarded? Who did it? Also, two of the most disturbing questions remain to be answered: Could it have been prevented? Can it be prevented from happening again?

Airline and airport security are the most sensitive subjects in the travel business. Until recently, airlines and governments were not willing to discuss security details and statistics. Now, much of that reluctance has subsided.

It started on Dec. 7, 1987, when a disgruntled former USAir employee used his airport identification card at Los Angeles International Airport to walk past security carrying a gun.

He then boarded one of the airline’s flights. Midway through the flight, he shot and killed his ex-boss, then the pilot, the co-pilot and himself. The plane crashed, killing all 44 aboard.

Posing as Passengers

The tragic incident served to draw much-needed attention to airport screening systems and weapons detection. The FAA moved quickly to identify and plug security breaches.

From Jan. 1 through June 30, 1988, Federal Aviation Administration inspectors posed as passengers and carried fake handguns and bombs through metal detectors and X-ray machines. Security personnel were able to catch 88.9% of the dummy weapons. On one hand, this is a substantial improvement over the same period in 1987, when the detection rate was only 78.9%.

In early December, just two weeks before the Pan Am explosion, the FAA announced the improved security record. The agency also announced that it was seeking to levy more than $1.6 million in fines against 29 airlines for 236 detection failures reported during the second and third quarters of 1988.

Even with the improved statistics, there’s still a 1-in-10 chance of a gun passing undetected at passenger security checkpoints.

Public Perception

That’s not a particularly comforting figure.

“I’m afraid we will never be at 100% safe,” one top airline official said. “People need to understand that airline security is based more on public perception than actual physical intervention to stop weapons or terrorists.”

To be sure, X-ray machines and metal detectors at airports serve more as psychological deterrents against mentally unstable passengers than they do to thwart acts of political terrorism. Each year, the FAA finds hundreds of discarded weapons in airport trash cans located near security checkpoints.

“What’s needed,” continued the airline official, “is improved hiring and training techniques for the people employed at security locations.”

Some airlines hire their own security personnel to monitor X-ray machines. But most are either staffed by airport-hired personnel or private security firms.

The FAA and the airlines have complained privately that these “rent-a-cops” lack the proper training to spot weapons passing through X-ray machines, not to mention more sophisticated electronic explosive devices.

Recently, I tried a test. At six different airports (I will not name them publicly), I packed my lap-top computer inside a small carry-on bag and put it on the conveyor belt to be X-rayed. Two of the airports were overseas. Four were in the United States.

First, however, I did some preliminary testing. I stood near a conveyor belt and watched the television screen with security personnel as my bag went through the X-ray machine. The machine clearly picked up the computer, which registered on the screen as an intricate set of wires and conduits. Surely enough to arouse suspicion.

I was ready to try the test. At five of the six airports, the bag was never stopped. At only one of the airports was I asked what I had in the bag. “Computer,” I said, and was waved through, no more questions asked.

This is simply not good security.

Successful Security

Then there’s the El Al system. This highly successful approach to airline, aircraft and passenger security has made the Israeli airline perhaps the most secure in the world against terrorists.

Passengers are required to report to the airport at least two hours before scheduled departure. Each passenger is made to identify his/her own bags, the bags are meticulously hand-searched, X-rayed, and passengers are then interviewed, one by one, by El Al security officers.

Two, and sometimes more, armed security officers then ride on the plane. They sit near the cockpit. U.S. airlines argue that El Al is a small airline, with only one or two flights a day from the countries it serves. They claim that to apply the El Al system to flights within the United States would be to totally disrupt air services, cause outrageous delays and inconvenience passengers.

European and Middle East airlines, however, seem to care more about safety than inconveniencing passengers. For example, I have been on a number of Lufthansa flights where passengers--prior to boarding the plane--were taken down to the Tarmac, where their luggage was lined up next to the baggage hold. Each passenger had to identify his baggage. Unidentified baggage didn’t fly.

I didn’t mind that I departed 20 minutes late on a Royal Jordanian 727 flight between Cairo and Amman. Passengers were bused out to the plane, where, again, our baggage was on the Tarmac. After identifications were made, about 12 bags remained. They stayed in Egypt.

In one of the many ironies involving Pan Am 103, there’s the story of the passenger who had checked in for the flight but had stayed in the duty-free shop too long. He missed the flight, and is alive thanks to his search for bargains.

But that story is more than a quirk of fate. Under current security policies, this was not supposed to happen.

On a recent British Airways flight between London and Los Angeles, after passengers had boarded, flight attendants and ground personnel discovered that the seat count was off by one passenger. Apparently, a man had checked in for the flight, had checked in baggage, but hadn’t boarded.

After a 30-minute delay, the captain explained to the passengers that we would not leave until the man could be found or his baggage off-loaded. Were the passengers angry? No . . . they applauded. The man finally showed up--he had dallied at the duty-free shop--and spent the next 11 hours of the polar flight getting the cold shoulder.

What can we expect in the wake of the Pan Am disaster? Here are some of the probable changes:

--A change in the terrorist “profile.” Until now, most holders of U.S. passports were allowed to pass their bags unchecked. Be prepared to have your carry-on luggage inspected more thoroughly.

--More checked baggage will be X-rayed and then emptied. (Don’t lock your bags.)

--Plan to arrive for an international flight at least two hours before departure.

--Be prepared to answer the following questions: Did you pack your own suitcase? Did anyone ask you to carry something for them?

--If you’re flying to Europe and transferring to another airline, even though your bags are tagged through to your final destination, be prepared to identify your bags before boarding your second flight.

Twice Breached Security

And yet, even as governments announced new stringent security measures, embarrassed British airport officials were at a loss to explain how a woman twice breached security at Britain’s two major airports within a week.

At Gatwick Airport, a 33-year-old German woman, Brigitte Jankard, passed through five different checkpoints without a ticket, boarding pass or passport before being stopped at the steps of a Cathay Pacific 747 bound for Hong Kong.

She did the same thing at Heathrow Airport just 24 hours before the Pan Am disaster. Her defense, before a Gatwick magistrate: “If I were going to put a bomb on a plane, I would have a passport and a ticket.”

Jankard was fined $185.