U.S. Not Dragging Feet but Is Cautious on New Arms Pact, Baker Says

WASHINGTON —  Secretary of State James A. Baker III, responding to charges that the United States is dragging its feet in dealing with the Soviet Union, insisted Tuesday that the Bush Administration is serious about moving forward in East-West arms control negotiations.

But Baker, appearing at a hastily called news conference, also warned that a treaty to reduce strategic nuclear weapons is still far off and said that the Administration intends to stick to its cautious approach toward Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

“I think we have to be careful not to become frantic and rush out here to negotiate a treaty on strategic arms--or anything else, for that matter--that would be non-ratifiable,” Baker said.

“We have no assurance as to what the final result (of Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the Soviet Union) will be,” he said. “So we shouldn’t go out and . . . do something dumb.”

Baker delivered his message just two days before a major series of meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, who has publicly chided the Administration for moving slowly on arms control issues.

Prudence or Paralysis?

His comments were also aimed at the growing debate in Washington over whether President Bush’s insistence on “prudence” in dealing with a changing Soviet Union has resulted, instead, in paralysis.

On Monday, for example, Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Me.) complained that the Administration’s approach to the Soviet Bloc has been marked by “ambivalence and hesitation and timidity.” And in an article published Tuesday, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, warned that the strategic arms talks are unlikely to move forward without a “display of presidential leadership.”

Baker pointedly rejected those criticisms. “I don’t think that we can appropriately be accused of having a wait-and-see attitude,” he said. “We have clearly recognized the historic changes that are taking place, not only in the Soviet Union but in Eastern Europe as well. That’s why we are fully engaged, not just on the full range of our arms control agenda, but on the broadened agenda (of U.S.-Soviet relations) as well.”

In a sharp dig at Mitchell, he observed: “When the President of the United States is rocking along with a 70% approval rating on his handling of foreign policy, if I were the leader of the opposition party, I might have something similar to say.”

‘Predictable, Disappointing’

Later Tuesday, Mitchell called Baker’s comment “predictable and disappointing,” adding, “Every time I or anyone else disagrees with any aspect of Administration policy, an Administration spokesman yells ‘politics.’ ”

Baker, in the first Washington news conference he has called in eight months as secretary of state, also offered several relatively modest arms control proposals as signs of the Administration’s earnestness:

--In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, he announced formally that the Administration will lift the U.S. demand for a ban on mobile missiles as part of a treaty on long-range nuclear arms, once Congress funds a U.S. mobile missile. The ban had long stood as an obstacle to concluding a treaty, but U.S. officials have said privately that it would be dropped as soon as Congress agrees to pay for either the MX or Midgetman mobile missile.

--In the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, Baker announced that the United States and its Western European allies have agreed on specific proposals for the verification of proposed North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Soviet troop reductions. The proposals will be offered formally at the East-West talks in Vienna today, Baker said.

--On chemical weapons, Baker said that he and Shevardnadze “have a reasonable shot at an agreement to exchange data on chemical stocks, which is a first practical step toward achieving real controls.” Other officials said that agreement is virtually complete and will almost certainly be signed when Baker and Shevardnadze meet at Jackson Hole, Wyo., later this week.

“There really is an increased momentum in arms control, when you look at the broad agenda and not just at START (the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks),” a senior official said.

Nevertheless, most arms control experts agree with Shevardnadze’s complaint that the Administration seems unwilling or unable to move decisively to complete the treaty.

Some critics believe that the White House has deliberately slowed the talks on strategic weapons to emphasize negotiations to cut conventional forces in Europe and to avoid antagonizing Republican conservatives early in the Bush Administration.

The Administration blames the impasse on Congress, which--for fiscal and other reasons--has refused to accept the Administration defense budget, making the Pentagon reluctant to agree to U.S. moves in strategic arms control.

‘Snags With Congress’

“We’re not consciously slowing down START” in favor of conventional force talks, one senior official said. “But the reality is we’ve run into snags with Congress on the key modernization programs” to build new mobile missiles and the new Stealth B-2 bomber, both of which are integral to the START agreement.

As a result, another Administration official predicted that a strategic arms treaty would not be completed before the end of next year. Officials said that no major breakthroughs are expected during Shevardnadze’s visit--unless a long-promised letter he is carrying from Gorbachev to Bush turns out to be “extremely forthcoming.”

The current roadblocks to completing the strategic arms treaty come after the Reagan Administration and Soviet officials agreed to about 400 pages of text, including its fundamental provision: a cut of up to 50% in each superpower arsenal to 6,000 long-range nuclear weapons each. Of these, up to 4,900 could be ballistic missile warheads, with the rest bombers or bomber-carried weapons.

Generous on Bombers

The prospective treaty is very generous in its treatment of bombers. For example, a bomber could carry as many nuclear bombs and short-range attack missiles as possible while counting as only one of the 6,000 weapons under the proposed treaty.

Senior Pentagon officials have argued that the U.S. position is “built around” the premise that the United States would take advantage of this liberal counting rule to build a bomber force of 132 B-2s and 100 B-1Bs. The planes would carry 2,000 to 3,000 bombs and attack missiles, which would not count against the ceiling.

Thus, with the anticipated bombers, both nations could possess not just the “accountable” 6,000--but as many as 9,000 strategic nuclear weapons altogether. Congressional threats to kill the B-2 program and curtail the B-1 program thus jeopardize almost one-third of the nuclear weapons that the Air Force counts on to threaten and deter Soviet nuclear power.

The Administration also has become reluctant to commit itself to proposed rules for counting air-launched cruise missiles on bombers, since ALCMs might have to play a larger role in the deterrent strategy if the bomber force is curtailed.

The Soviets want to count every ALCM against the 6,000-weapon ceiling. Under this approach, a B-52 armed with 20 ALCMs would count as 21. But the United States has argued that the bombers almost never carry their maximum missile load because of range limits and mission requirements.

The Administration has proposed allocating an average number of ALCMs to each ALCM-carrying bomber. It initially proposed eight per bomber, then 10, and reportedly is prepared to go as high as 12, once Congress decides how much financing to provide for the bomber program.