Big Risks Come in Small Packages : Win or Lose, We’d Pay Dearly for Intervention in Panama

The major lesson of the last two decades is the expanding capacity of small nations to confound great powers that try to manage their internal affairs. Some thought the real lesson of the United States’ failure in Vietnam was an excess of democracy and a lack of will. But the Soviet Union, with more will and less democracy, had to accept the same lesson in Afghanistan. Even nations like Vietnam and Cuba have been taught the lesson in Cambodia and Ethiopia.

The abortive coup in Panama last week has raised again the cry for decisive military action to remove Gen. Manuel A. Noriega and vanquish the Vietnam syndrome. If Noriega were wise, he would negotiate the terms of his exit now when he appears strong and in control, rather than let someone else choose when and how he will leave. But it would be unwise to rely on Noriega’s wisdom.

The benefits of replacing Noriega are substantial for the United States, Panama, and for most everyone except the Medellin drug cartel. The question is whether the costs of doing that by unilateral military intervention exceed the benefits.

The Panama Canal Treaties give the United States the right to defend the canal, not to change Panama’s government. While our friends do not defend Noriega, they would stand with our adversaries in condemning U.S. intervention against him.

The human cost of a major intervention would be high in casualties, including many American citizens living in Panama. Even if a move against Noriega succeeded, U.S. citizens in Panama would be vulnerable.

Although there is dissension in Panama’s armed forces, Noriega retains the support of numerous loyalists, as we saw last week. If we actively supported one faction in a targeted attack to capture Noriega, and if that group failed, humiliation might compel the Administration to escalate.

Success could create as many problems for the United States as failure. Nationalists opposed to Noriega would join with loyalists to thwart U.S. control. We would have to increase our involvement in the country’s politics and pump billions into its economy to buttress the new regime. The deeper we became involved, the weaker the new government would appear. Our continued occupation of the country would generate anti-American protests worldwide, putting us on the defensive in every forum. We would look militaristic just when the Soviets have become the champions of peace and tolerance.

There are other options besides intervention. The “Group of Eight” Latin American nations will meet in Lima this week. The United States should encourage them to expel Panama from membership until Noriega is gone, and to take a series of gradually escalating steps to isolate and bring pressure to bear on him. Latin American pressure is harder for Noriega to deal with than U.S. pressure, which he uses to flaunt his nationalist credentials. These and other diplomatic and political options are not sure of success, but neither is military intervention.

Panama is not Vietnam, but its lesson is relevant. The true test of a great nation today is how well it copes with the frustration of not getting its way. Whether it’s Jimmy Carter coping with Iran, Ronald Reagan fuming at Libya and Nicaragua, or George Bush frustrated with Panama--all three Presidents have been compelled to acknowledge that the world’s most powerful nation could not have its way in relatively small nations.

Those who criticize the retreat of U.S. power miss the point: The United States is not declining; sovereignty in the developing world is advancing. If we stand back from our competition with the Soviet Union and our visceral need to pummel defiant or corrupt leaders of small countries, we will see that the cost of unilateral military intervention is escalating. This is a generally positive development; in the long term, it reduces conflicts and encourages nations to work out their own problems.

If a crisis like Panama’s is judged a threat to the region rather than just our obsession, then collective intervention is the proper alternative. But the Group of Eight will need to take many steps first before such a last resort can be considered.

There are good reasons why the Bush Administration has been cautious in not crossing the line between verbally encouraging the Panamanian armed forces to retire Noriega and intervening directly to achieve that objective. The United States would be making a grave mistake if it crossed that line. If we appear obsessed with the small country of Panama today, think of what the relationship would be like if we intervened.