What’s Left for the Latin Left? : Nicaragua: The Sandinistas’ loss is a milestone for modernizing socialist ideals in the face of social and economic crisis.

The election upset in Nicaragua is important from many perspectives, and will be a topic for commentary and analysis for some time to come. It is a watershed in Nicaraguan history, and a decisive event for Central America as a whole.

Less obviously, the defeat of the Sandinista government is a milestone for the Latin American left, which is living through its most traumatic crisis ever. Its response to the events in Nicaragua, along with those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, will determine whether the left will remain a major reference point in this hemisphere or pass into irrelevance.

Daniel Ortega’s defeat is the most shattering setback the Latin left has suffered since Salvador Allende’s overthrow by the military in Chile in 1973. It is sure to provoke soul-searching, identity crises and downright depression throughout the left side of the hemisphere’s political spectrum. It should, because only then will the political forces ranging from the moderate left-of-center to the radical fringe be able to come to terms with the monumental changes under way in the world. Only through such a process can it hope to benefit from what should be an exceptionally and paradoxically favorable situation for its future prospects.

The most immediate explanation for the Sandinistas’ loss seems evident: The Nicaraguan people, fed up with 10 years of war, apparently believed that the only way to end the Contra offensive and the U.S. embargo, and the resulting pervasive economic degradation of the country, was through U.S. acceptance of the election results, which inevitably meant an opposition victory. The Nicaraguans were probably right in believing that a vote for Ortega meant continued American hostility; they are probably wrong in thinking that a vote for Violeta Chamorro ensures American financial largess.

The Nicaraguan revolutionaries must also attribute their defeat to more general and long-term trends that are affecting Latin America as a whole. The hemisphere is experiencing an extraordinary conjunction of major democratic advances and economic and social regression. The Contra war, the U.S. embargo and economic mismanagement (partly due to the war and the embargo) have turned Nicaragua into a wasteland. But the country’s affliction is simply an extreme manifestation of a process that reaches far beyond Nicaragua’s borders. The subcontinent in its entirety has been going through a dramatic crisis characterized by economic stagnation, social regression and massive decapitalization. Throughout the 1980s, per-capita GDP growth grew only in Colombia and did not fall only in Chile and the Dominican Republic.

The coincidence of economic decline and democratic gain bodes disaster for incumbents in general and in particular for political entities identified with the status quo. In Latin America, that means the military (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay), or one-party rule (Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua), or two-party monopoly (Venezuela, Colombia). The coincidence of those two trends had disastrous results for the Sandinistas, but in theory it should be encouraging for the left in the long term. That promise, however, could be aborted by the other underlying trend that brought about Daniel Ortega’s demise: the transformation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The end of the Cold War also means the elimination of what was known as the “socialist bloc.” More importantly, it entails the dissolution of the socialist paradigm, which over the years has been broadly adapted, with additions or subtractions that each party, government or author wished to apply. Yet the collapse of the paradigm in the Soviet Bloc has not spared the Latin left: To the extent that any movement or regime in Latin America is perceived as being identified with the Soviet Union or Cuba, it now pays dearly with public opinion or at the polls. Conversely, it is no surprise that where the Latin left or left-of-center is strongest today--Brazil and Mexico--it is also totally newly born, home-grown and devoid of any ties, debts or emotional attachment to the “socialist camp.”

The end of the paradigm has plunged this hemisphere’s orthodox left into a collective depression. Having indefinitely postponed dealing with issues such as democracy, sound economic management and relations with the United States, it found itself in a totally untenable, indefensible position as the socialist world collapsed and the Cold War came to an end. In this sense, the Sandinistas’ commitment to a fair election, their acceptance of defeat and their restructuring as an institutional opposition is a positive development. It obliges the Sandinistas to take democracy seriously--like it or not--and not just tactically. Above all, it gives them a marvelous opportunity to remove the “Soviet-Cuban” handicap, and once again be and be seen by their countrymen and neighbors as a purely Nicaraguan, fully democratic movement. Such a full-fledged commitment to democratic practices is something that the traditional Latin American left, with the notable exception of Salvador Allende, had been until now unwilling or unable to achieve.

If the Sandinista Front’s acceptance of opposition status is fully carried out, it will allow the comandantes to renew ties with their followers--as many as are left--and be rid of the arrogant and authoritarian habits they acquired over 10 years of nearly absolute rule. It will force them to learn once again how to struggle for power, but under different rules: those they themselves set and bequeathed to their nation, in a gesture that was perhaps forced upon them but is nonetheless undisputably noble and generous. They have become an example that other pending processes of democratization would do well to follow. In one case, Cuba, it would save the revolution’s place in history; in Mexico, it would spare the country a near-certain tragedy.