The Politics of Any Israeli Retaliation : Coalition might lose Syria (so what?) but keep Egypt (good)

There’s no way to know if Iraq’s leader held his breath in nervous anticipation when his Scud missiles crashed down on Israel. But certainly the leaders of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt held theirs, and no doubt their concerns continue. What worries them is that if and when Israel gets drawn into the fighting, even reactively, even marginally, the inherently shaky anti-Iraq coalition could be subject to rending strains.

At least one or more of its Arab participants might choose to pull out to stand, if only symbolically, alongside a brother Arab, Saddam Hussein, against Israel, the traditional enemy. That could put pressure on other Arabs in the coalition to do the same. The nightmarish consequence would be a political victory for Saddam throughout the Arab world, whatever his fate on the battlefield might be.

The Bush Administration, which worked hard to enlist Arabs in the anti-Iraq effort, has also worked hard to get Israel to commit itself to restraint. Jerusalem agreed not to strike Iraq preemptively, even after Saddam publicly warned that he planned to bombard Israel. After the first terror attacks by Iraq’s inaccurate missiles, Israel apparently signaled Washington that it would stay its hand for now. Its military leaders did make clear, however, that at some point retaliation is virtually inevitable. But the second round of Iraqi missiles sent against Israel on Saturday almost surely will provoke response. What then?

The most probable result is that Syria, Iraq’s bitter ideological foe but also one of Israel’s most implacable enemies, would opt out of the coalition where it has never felt comfortable. President Hafez Assad has already collected his rewards for signing on. Saudi Arabia gave him more than $1 billion for sending a few thousand troops to sit in its desert, where they are barred--Assad has since said--from fighting other Arabs. President Bush, in a meeting in Geneva, gave Assad the public handshake and smile that validates his importance as a major regional figure. Syria has already warned that it refuses to recognize any Israeli right to respond to an Iraqi attack. Assad is clearly a man who, having dined well at his host’s table, is now looking for an excuse to go home early.

The Administration expects greater fidelity from Egypt--and from all signs it is getting it--and from Saudi Arabia. Both have privately recognized Israel’s right to respond to an Iraqi attack. The legal basis for the coalition fighting Iraq rests on the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Rationally--a word always best used with caution in regard to the Middle East--no one can deny that Israel has every right to defend its land and people against foreign attack. Rationally, it would be folly for Egypt--let alone Saudi Arabia--to break up the coalition if Israel should so respond. For the Saudis it would be virtually suicidal to order U.S. forces to pack up and go, leaving them to face Iraq alone.

Israel’s right to respond to an armed attack is beyond question. Yet continued restraint is still arguably preferable, for the simple and very good reason that a military response now is just what a desperate Saddam Hussein wants. It would allow him to appeal to the Arab masses for political support over the heads of their more thoughtful leaders. That could complicate matters greatly for the coalition, for the United States, for future regional stability. An official of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunis is proclaiming that the very fact of Iraq’s attacks on Israel means that Israel is now a party to the conflict, and that all Arabs must now unite on Iraq’s side. That kind of loony reasoning can be dismissed out of hand. But it is much more difficult to dismiss the potential political consequences of an Israeli strike against Iraq, however justified such a response is.