NEWS ANALYSIS : Germany--the No. 1 Political Casualty : Alliance: The Kohl government’s paralysis in the early days of the war has cost it prestige and influence.

Two weeks of war in the Persian Gulf has claimed no greater political casualty than Germany.

Only two months ago, a newly united, sovereign Germany looked secure as the Bush Administration’s closest NATO ally. Rich, strong and confident, it seemed the natural leader of the “new” Europe. Newly reelected Chancellor Helmut Kohl looked like a fast-emerging world statesman and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher a key architect of a much-heralded new European order.

A devastating combination of events, however, has changed all that, sharply diminishing German prestige and influence. The extent of this damage and how long it lasts remains uncertain.

From the worried comment of the U.S. ambassador in Bonn, Vernon A. Walters, who recently warned of a German “self-isolation,” to the tongue-lashing reportedly administered by a senior British officer to a German Embassy military attache in London about German hysteria, a distinct, politically troubling, gap has emerged between Germany and its allies.

The Kohl government’s paralysis in the early days of the war, the waves of anti-American street protests and a drumbeat of comments from leading politicians seemingly aimed at trying to wiggle out of longstanding Western alliance commitments, have combined to stir old doubts and sow new resentment about Germany among its closest allies.

With the Kremlin’s tanks in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius signaling a sudden halt to the Soviet liberalization, Germany’s rosy, post-unification vision of itself guiding a peaceful Europe in a more gentle post-Cold War world has suddenly become a nightmare.

Revelations that German companies and technicians helped make possible the chemical weapons that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein now may be aiming at Israel have undermined almost overnight the country’s fragile, emotive relationship with the Jewish state, a relationship nursed so carefully over the decades.

Aware of its own crisis, German leaders in recent days have launched a major exercise in damage limitation, including offering an additional $5.5 billion in financial support for the United States in its war effort, $535 million for the British war effort and weapons and other military equipment to Israel--and announcing new proposals for stiff new controls on the export of military-related technology.

Despite these efforts, the political damage remains significant.

For example, Britain, not Germany, is once again America’s key ally in crisis and its European touchstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Shortly after assuming office, President Bush had carefully shifted American’s “special” transatlantic relationship from London and then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, where it had been centered during the Ronald Reagan presidency, to Bonn and Chancellor Kohl.

“We’ve seen a dramatic reversal in the strongest possible terms in the ‘special relationship,’ ” commented Hans Binnendijk, a senior analyst at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

Germany’s attempts to narrow the terms under which it might have to aid its NATO ally Turkey against an Iraqi attack, as well as suggestions from opposition leader Hans-Jochen Vogel, a Social Democrat, that 18 Alpha anti-infantry jets sent to Turkey earlier this month be withdrawn, drew scowls at the alliance headquarters in Brussels and near-rage in Ankara.

“Germany has become so rich, it’s completely lost its fighting spirit,” commented Turkish President Turgut Ozal bitterly.

Attempting to defuse the situation, Bonn announced Tuesday that it plans to add to, rather than withdraw, forces from Turkey. But it remains questionable whether the shipment of Roland and Hawk antiaircraft missiles to its NATO partner will be enough to repair the damage of Bonn’s long hesitation.

Certainly, many alliance members have found it hard to grasp how the first reaction for Germany, the greatest single benefactor of NATO’s collective security for more than 40 years, could be to try to narrow its own obligations to defend an alliance partner.

In a newspaper commentary earlier this week, Kohl’s former press spokesman Peter Boenish commented ruefully, “The Americans, the British, the French and Italians all consider us cowards . . . . The question being asked abroad is, ‘Are the Germans capable of defense at all? What will they do if their own security is threatened, just send themselves a check?’ ”

While analysts agree that Germany has suffered considerable political damage during the past two weeks, they also believe that the course of the war will determine how lasting and how severe this damage might be.

Any Iraqi use of German-made poison gas, either against coalition ground forces or in an attack against Israel, would be a major blow to Germany, they agree.

“It’s too early to do a post-mortem,” commented John Roper, director of the Institute for Security Studies at the Western European Union in Paris. “If the war goes well, then the dangers (to Germany) can be limited. If it goes badly, then there could be an ugly backlash in the transatlantic relationship and within Europe.”

Binnendijk expressed concern that delicate alliance issues, such as a possible updating of Germany-based U.S. nuclear weapons, could become much more difficult if residual bitterness between Germany and her partners lingers long after the war.

“You already have Germans in the streets charging the U.S. with starting the war and some fairly strong responses to this in the (U.S.) Congress,” he said. “If you inject an issue like that into this kind of atmosphere, you could have the quick withdrawal of all U.S. forces (from Germany) and that would have a profound effect on European security.”

Even if the tensions between Germany and its allies do ease, the pressures of recent events have shown the weakness of institutions in which Germans such as Kohl and Genscher had invested so much political capital, mainly out of a belief that they would be the vehicle for shaping much of Europe’s future.

The strains of the Gulf crisis, for example, has shown the depth of political differences among member states of the European Community and just how far away the goal of true European political union is. From the beginning, the community has played only a marginal role in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the 33-nation body of European nations plus the United States and Canada was seen by Genscher as a key piece of political architecture for Europe’s future. Yet the CSCE has not only been dormant in the Gulf crisis but has seemed impotent in the face of turmoil in its own region: the Soviet crackdown on Lithuanian nationalists.

“Genscherism is fine in blue skies and a gentle breeze,” commented Michael Stuermer, director of the Ebenhausen Institute, near Munich, a government-supported think tank on international security issues. “But the last couple of weeks have shown it’s not worth much in a storm.”