Regional Outlook : Iran Plots While Neighbors Fight : By playing all sides against the middle, Tehran is hoping to reclaim a prominent role for Old Persia in the New Persian Gulf.

WASHINGTON —  Ostracized since its 1979 revolution, pulverized for eight years during the last Gulf War and sidelined even in the region named after it during the latest Persian Gulf conflict, the Islamic Republic of Iran is now attempting a comeback.

Or so it appears in piecing together the unraveling clues in perhaps the Gulf War’s biggest mystery to date: What are the Iranians up to?

First, somewhere around 100 Iraqi warplanes and civilian aircraft land in Iran, a bitter and longstanding rival. Tehran acts astonished and indignantly declares it will impound the planes. Its neutrality will not be undermined!

Then, Iran opens a bank account for public donations to help Iraqi civilians victimized by the U.S.-led coalition’s bombardment; foodstuffs and medicine are collected to ship to Baghdad. Leading mullahs pledge to fight alongside Iraq if Israel enters the war.

Next, prominent officials from Iraq, Europe, North Africa and the Arabian peninsula arrive in Tehran--not exactly a hotbed of diplomacy over the past 12 years--to talk about Persian Gulf peace.

And finally, on Monday, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani says he’s ready to meet Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and talk to the United States in an effort to mediate an end to the war.

Once again, the Iranians--as has been their way under both monarchs and mullahs--are crafting a crisis for their own gain. This time, Tehran is playing all sides to ensure it ends up the winner of a game in which it hasn’t even been a player.

“What Iranians want from this war is a new Gulf order,” said R. K. Ramazani, an Iran expert at the University of Virginia. “This is the way to assert themselves and their role in the Gulf in the future.”

With a proud history reaching back to the ancient Persian empire and nearly double the population of the rest of the Gulf states combined, Iran feels it has a strong claim to regional leadership.

“The great irony is that the United States spent the better part of the 1980s striving to prevent Iranian dominance in the Persian Gulf, but the outcome of this war is transparently likely to produce just that result,” added Augustus Richard Norton of the International Peace Academy in New York.

“The Persian Gulf may, as a result of these events, indeed become the Persians’ gulf,” Norton said.

The shape of that “new Gulf order” reflects a fundamental policy shift in the Islamic Republic since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the rise of President Rafsanjani.

It’s not a total flip-flop. At least rhetorically, Iraqi President Hussein is still “the butcher of Baghdad.” Israel remains “the Zionist enemy.” And the United States is still “the Great Satan.”

But Tehran’s tone has certainly changed. “If there is hope for the salvation of the Iraqi nation, why shouldn’t I meet Saddam?” Rafsanjani asked rhetorically at a Monday news conference in the Iranian capital. And he added that contacts with the United States--which broke diplomatic relations with Iran in 1980--could go through the Swiss embassy, which handles American interests in Tehran.

Separated from the regions they bridge--the Middle East and South Asia--by two great mountain ranges and three bodies of water, the Persians have always been a society and culture unto themselves. Their historic suspicion of outsiders and sense of superiority are unlikely to disappear.

But the need to survive after their own debilitating, 1980-88 war with Iraq, combined with the current rapid world changes are spawning a new realism.

In contrast to the early days of the revolution, when Iran cultivated Shiite extremism in Iraq and called for another Islamic republic in Baghdad, the mullahs are now cautioning against the dismemberment of their powerful neighbor. Turkey was recently warned against meddling in Iraq’s Kurdish north after the war.

“They want to see Iraq weakened but not destroyed,” explained Shaul Bakhash, author of “The Reign of the Ayatollahs” and a history professor at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va. “One might have thought they’d be eager to gain access to the Shiite holy places at Karbala (in Iraq), but they in fact don’t welcome a free-for-all for parts of Iraq.”

Iran’s behavior today has its roots in policy shifts that began at the end of the last Gulf War. “After the 1988 cease-fire, Rafsanjani said the government had even worried that if Iran had succeeded in taking Baghdad, the mullahs were unsure of what they would do with Iraq. It’s such a difficult country to rule,” Bakhash said.

Indeed, instead of propagating Islamic revolution in Muslim countries, Iran is now seeking coexistence with the conservative Gulf sheikdoms. Albeit reluctantly, that even includes Saudi Arabia, whose monarchy was once called “illegitimate” by Tehran.

“Coming out of the war (with Iraq) without any military prowess and a shattered economy, security and economic growth came up after the war as the highest priorities,” Ramazani said. “By pushing regional cooperation, they’re saying they’ll peacefully coexist regardless of what the other regimes are. Economically, they’re talking about interdependence. They’re aware of what’s going on in Europe.

“They’re looking for a more hospitable environment, so they’ve had to swallow the conception of regional security that prevailed during the heyday of Khomeini,” Ramazani added.

Iran’s version of a new Gulf order centers on joint security among the eight littoral states: the two most populous nations of Iran and Iraq, and the six wealthy but vulnerable emirates in the Gulf Cooperation Council--Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and United Arab Emirates.

“They’re talking about self-reliance regionally and no reliance on outside powers. The sooner foreign forces withdraw, the better,” Ramazani explained.

Dominated for much of the 20th Century by outsiders--first by the British and Russians, and then by the Americans--Iran would rather compromise regionally than allow foreigners to shape the Gulf’s future.

Deep-seated fears that the United States will establish a large and lasting military presence in the Gulf after the war has particularly hastened rapprochement with its former rivals.

“I see a lot of evidence that Iranians want positive relations with the GCC,” said Scott Harrop, a University of Virginia professor who returned last week from a seminar in Iran on Gulf security.

“They realize there’ve been suspicions in the GCC and past difficulties but they feel they have to continue to pursue dialogue so they can build genuine trust. That’s where their future lies.”

Tehran’s new realism is being matched by interest among the Gulf sheikdoms. At the GCC summit in December, the new consensus on a future formula for security welcomed Iran as “a distinguished member of the Gulf community.”

And after years of tension over Kuwait’s financial and logistical assistance for Iraq during the last Gulf War, Kuwaiti envoys now speak warmly of Iran’s support since Iraq’s Aug. 2 invasion.

Under Rafsanjani, relations have been repaired or restored with all but one of the GCC states--Saudi Arabia. That diplomatic impasse centers mainly on terms for Iranians to make the annual pilgrimage to the Grand Mosque in Mecca. A Saudi crackdown after Iranian demonstrations during the 1987 pilgrimage left 400 dead. But some analysts predict that behind-the-scenes dialogue will open the way to renewed diplomatic ties before the annual Haj pilgrimage this June.

Iran’s actions over the past week reflect its emerging new agenda on the eve of the revolution’s 12th anniversary on Feb. 11.

Sheltering Baghdad’s most expensive military gadgetry gives Tehran leverage with all sides in the Gulf--as the war progresses and afterward. Saudi Arabia and Western members of the multinational force have as much interest as Iraq in Tehran keeping Baghdad’s fighters and bombers.

“By taking the planes, Iran is prepositioning itself to shape the future of the Gulf,” Ramazani said.

It also can exact a price from Baghdad--and perhaps already has--for their return.

Meanwhile, condemning the Western bombardment of Iraqi civilian areas and mobilizing humanitarian aid for “the innocent people of Iraq” fosters the spirit of cooperation among peoples of the Gulf--as much for the future as for the present.

“Sympathy with the Iraqi people is not at all an illogical position,” Bakhash said. At least 60% of Iraqis are Shiite--the dominant Muslim sect in neighboring Iran--even though the Iraqi leadership has long been dominated by the rival Sunni sect.

It also plays to the growing alarm and, in countries such as nearby Pakistan, opposition to Operation Desert Storm. The destruction of Iraq, the birthplace of civilization, is increasingly replacing the liberation of Kuwait as the focus of Arab and Islamic reaction. And Iran is not going to surrender its Islamic credentials to others.

“Iran must be sensitive to the success of Saddam Hussein in mobilizing Islamic opinion and sympathies,” Bakhash said.

The threat against Israel is more rhetorical than real. Having lost up to 40% of its arsenal, including most of its own air force, during the last Gulf War, Tehran is hardly in a position to help hold off the U.S.-led coalition or Israel. But the warning adds to the pressure on Israel to show restraint.

“Iran has begun to be genuinely worried about the widening of the conflict,” Bakhash said.

Finally, its peacemaking efforts lend a clear boost to its image as a broker in the region.

“They want to see a peace, a shorter war,” Ramazani explained. “They don’t want to see the Gulf destroyed.”

“All in all,” Norton concluded, “they’ve been very clever.”

But the whole package of actions also plays to the wider world. Maintaining neutrality may be the first tangible means of proving that Iran is finally prepared to play by the rules of the international community.

“The Iranians will be trying to demonstrate their trustworthiness to the international community. They wouldn’t say the West--they would dance over all that,” Harrop commented. “But if you said the world, they’re delighted to say that they support sanctions and they’re actively prosecuting those who violate them.”

Iran, which unlike Iraq emerged from the last Gulf conflict without any foreign debt, is now seeking credits from Europe to help with an estimated $350-billion worth of postwar reconstruction. And it’s still trying to sort through the decade-old accord with the United States on assets blocked during the 1979-1981 hostage ordeal.

“It is clear that Iran has moved beyond its revolutionary phase and has returned to acting like a normal state conducting normal statesmanship,” Norton added. “Throughout the course of the war, Iran has benefited on a number of levels. It has regained diplomatic respectability. It has enjoyed significant international financial support, with promises of more. And it has watched, no doubt with some joy and satisfaction, while its enemy Iraq has been pummeled and bled by the international coalition.”

After so many false starts, is Iran really moving to normalize its foreign policy? Harrop offered an anecdote about his trip to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s ornate tomb in Tehran’s southern suburbs on the Muslim sabbath, normally a time and place of great emotion and zealotry.

“Several people came up and asked if I were an American. I was treated with great courtesy. Several wanted to talk.” Then he laughed. “And one of them wanted to know if Georgia Tech really deserved the national (football) championship.”

Tehran’s Priorities in the Persian Gulf

* On Security: Short-term, wants Iraq cut down to size to prevent future aggression. Long-term, seeks new regional cooperation with the seven littoral Arab nations.

* On Regional Politics: Desires acceptance as a key player and is recasting its Islamic message in less threatening terms to get it.

* On Oil: Seems less concerned with rigid price schemes--low quotas and high prices; more interested in stable markets that take into account mutual interests of producing and consuming nations.

* On Foreign Policy: Still sees U.S. as “the Great Satan” and Israel as “the Zionist enemy,” but has abided by U.N. resolutions and refused to link Gulf crisis with Palestinian issue; hopes for international recognition--and economic credits to rebuild from its own devastating war with Iraq.

* On Domestic Policy: President Hashemi Rafsanjani pushing for a “kinder, gentler” Iran onissues ranging from divorce to punishments such as stoning and amputations for violations of Islamic law, while still trying to cement Islam as the cornerstone of society.