Airport 1991: More Must Be Done to Make It Safer : Time for investigators and Congress to look at the whole system

One hundred and one airline passengers and crew members were put in harm’s way at Los Angeles International Airport Friday night. They were put there not by some random mechanical breakdown but by the very system that was created to protect them. Thirty-four of them died.

WHAT AND WHY: What went wrong seems clear. An air traffic controller cleared a twin turboprop Sky West commuter plane to taxi to the end of runway 24-Left and stand by for permission to take off. Just over a minute later, the controller cleared a USAir 737 jetliner to land on the same runway. As it flared out over the runway for a landing, it settled on top of the Sky West commuter and burst into flame.

Why it happened is the big question. And it will keep investigators poring over clues and testimony for months, trying to figure out the role of the mix of people, electronic devices, airport design, rules, airline competition and system management that doomed the planes last week--and then working out ways to keep the fatal mix from happening again.

NEAR-COLLISIONS: Near-misses--or what the Federal Aviation Administration calls “operational errors” that put aircraft too close together, either in the air or on land--have been slashed by half nationally since 1984. Will the fact that near-misses at LAX have more than doubled--from two to five--in the last three years help investigators solve the Friday mysteries? Or is the increase as insignificant as the numbers are small?

CALLS FOR HELP: More than two years ago, it appears, FAA officials in Los Angeles and in Washington recommended that an assistant controller be assigned to the LAX tower during rush hours to help. Investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board have found documents showing that the idea came up shortly after an airliner was forced to abort its takeoff when another taxied onto the runway ahead of it. A second request for help in the tower was made last year after a landing airliner pulled up to miss another jet poised for takeoff on the runway it was approaching, a situation chillingly close to last Friday’s disaster.

Was an assistant controller on duty Friday? If not, why not? If the idea was valid at all, there was good reason for both proposals to add an extra pair of hands and eyes in the tower.

GROUND RADAR: Local FAA regulations apparently required a 20-year-old radar screen to sweep LAX runways and taxiways after dark to help traffic controllers keep tabs on planes moving on the ground between runways and terminal buildings. Apparently it broke down with some regularity, and it was not working Friday night. A new generation of ground radar is being developed for the FAA and could be ready for use in two or three years. It would flash warnings of impending collisions and distinguish planes from refueling trucks and baggage carts, something the old radar cannot do. Primitive as it is, FAA managers apparently considered the old LAX radar important enough to use at night. Why, then, was it not considered important enough to keep in working shape?

THE SYSTEM: In theory, the network of people and electronic equipment that guides airliners between cities and onto runways has room to expand to meet consumer need. But it will take the best of both training and technology to put the theory to practice.

It also will take money, and Friday’s disaster is a grim reminder that a nearly $8-billion Airport and Airways Trust Fund that can be spent only on aviation facilities is frozen in Washington to keep the federal deficit down. Is essential safety equipment frozen along with it?

Analysts say that 80% of persons working in FAA towers a decade ago were rated as “full-performance” controllers; today, the number has slipped to 62%. It will take money to bring the ratio back to where it belongs.

The time probably has come for investigators and Congress to team up for a searching look, not just at one accident but at the whole system.