AFTERMATH OF THE COUP : Gorbachev’s Story--’I Will Stick to My Position to the End’

\o7 MOSCOW\f7 —  Here is a partial text of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s news conference Thursday, as translated by the Associated Press .

Gorbachev: Today’s press conference is taking place after events which more than anything I hope are not repeated, and that similar press conferences on this topic will not have to take place.

We made it through. As I want to be accurate--did we make it all the way through or not? Yes, we did, the most difficult test in all the years in the reformation of our society since 1985.

We faced a real, without any exaggeration, anti-constitutional coup organized by reactionary forces, which appeared to be in the leadership, in the very center of the leadership. (These are) people that I advanced, believed in and trusted, who appeared to be not only the participants but the organizers of this coup against the president, against the constitution, against perestroika and against democracy.

On Aug. 18, 10 minutes to 5 p.m., my head guard told me that a group of people had arrived demanding a meeting with me. I told them that I was not expecting anybody, had invited nobody and that nobody notified me in advance.

Who invited them? The chief guard told me he knew nothing either.

Why were they let in? Because the chief of the State Security Guard organization . . . came with them.

In other cases, the guards would not have let them in. This is the law, a strict law, but they are necessary. I decided to clarify who sent them here, and as far as I had (available) all sorts of communications (at my disposal)--ordinary, governmental, strategic and satellite. I was working in my office, picked up the one telephone, it didn’t work. I lifted the second, the third, the fourth, the fifth--nothing. Then I tried the house phone and realized nothing worked and I was cut off.

I then understood that the mission would for me be not the mission that we ordinarily deal with.

Family Stands Fast

Then I went to another place, called the family, my wife, daughter, and said that an event had taken place. I didn’t need any new information, I knew that a very serious event was going on, that they would either blackmail me or there would be attempts to arrest me or take me away somewhere. Basically, anything could happen.

I told Raisa Maximovna and (daughter) Irina Anatoleyevna that if we talk about the main thing, about politics, the course of politics, that I will stick to my position to the end and that would I not step back, not under any pressure, blackmail or threats. I would neither change nor take up new positions.

All the family--I thought it was important to tell them, you understand why, because I realized that anything could happen, especially to the members of my family. This we also know. The family told me that . . . this should be my decision and that (they) would go with me through this to the end. This was the end of our conversation.

Then I went to invite them, but by that time they had already come in, they didn’t stand on ceremony, with the head of the presidential apparatus, (Chief of Staff Valery) Boldin, ahead of them. They gave the president an ultimatum: to transfer all power to the vice president.

I told them that before I answered, I wanted to know who had sent them, what committee. They said the State Committee for the State of the Emergency in the country. Who created it? I didn’t create it; the Supreme Soviet didn’t create it.

They told me that people had already united and they needed a presidential decree. Either you issue this decree and stay here or transfer your powers to the vice president. They said the situation in the country was such that it was nearing catastrophe, and that we should take measures, a state of emergency, other measures won’t do, we shouldn’t daydream anymore, etc.

I told them that I knew the situation in the country better than anyone, politically, economically, and the life of people and all the difficulties they were facing, and that we had come to the phase where we need to do everything as fast and decisive as we can to live better.

I told them that I was always an opponent of such methods, not only because of political and moral reasons but because in the history of our country they have always led to the death of hundreds, thousands and millions of deaths. And we need to get away from that, and to refuse it forever. If we do differently, we are not behaving like ourselves, and everything that we started we’ll have to bury forever. We should agree that we are going in a bloody circle.

Then I told them that you and those who sent you are adventurists. You will kill yourselves, but the hell with you, it’s your problem. Do what you want to do, but you will also kill the country, everything that we are doing. And now that we are close to the signing of the Union Treaty. . . . For an entire month, we worked on important decisions dealing with foodstuffs, fuel, the solving of financial problems, so that we can stabilize as quickly as possible the political and economic situation and more quickly advance the market process.

Let people have more opportunities to work in all spheres of life.

Only those who want to commit suicide can now suggest to lead a totalitarian regime in the country.

Resignation Demanded

They demanded that I resign. You won’t get that from me, not one or the other. Tell that to the people who sent you here. . . . We can’t have such conversations any more. You can tell them that the president is ready to immediately sign any telegram, and we have a pretext, we are going to sign (the Union Treaty) on the 20th, that was, by the way, Sunday night, and I, by the way, was finishing all preparations for my speech for that celebrated event.

OK, I told them (the plotters). So, tomorrow (Monday) you will declare a state of emergency, then what? Think several steps ahead. One day, two days, three days--try to think ahead. The country won’t accept this new order. Do you want to play on their hardships, the fact that the people are tired. . . .

One of the scenarios featured in the article (Gorbachev was writing) was this one. And now . . . the characters in this scenario appeared here. But my argument in this scenario was that this is death to the society, this is a dead end, send society back, and it will bury all that we now have.

I am ready to call a Congress of People’s Deputies, I am ready for the Supreme Soviet (to meet). If parts of the leadership have doubts, let’s get together, let’s discuss things, all the deputies are in their places, they know what’s happening, so let’s make a decision, if it’s to be a state of emergency, let it be a state of emergency. I will stick to this way (of solving things), the way of consensus, the way of deepening reforms and the way of cooperation with the West. Those are the three main directions. So now we need to synchronize them, act together, especially because there is a desire of these peoples to cooperate with us now during this decisive time.

But you know, that was a conversation with deaf mutes. They evidently were ready, their cycle was in motion, now it’s clear that we couldn’t have any more conversations.

So report that I categorically say that you will face defeat . . . but I am scared for the people and for all we have done in these years in order to. . . .

So that’s how it ended, when they received my ultimatum demand to their ultimatum, my ultimatum answer and my demand to report my conclusions.

Fully Isolated

Well, after that, everything developed according to the logic of confrontation. Full isolation from land and sea. Thirty-two security people stayed with me, to the end, as they say, they decided to stay. They divided up all the spheres of defense, including my family, divided all the locations, and decided to stand until the end.

When it became known that at the (junta’s Monday) press conference, they said I was ill, seriously, and that in general, I understood, that I was not capable of returning to a normal life, then it became clear to me that what would follow was that reality would soon be synchronized to this statement.

This is why--it was understood the same way by security--a decision was taken to refuse all ordered food and live on only what we already had at hand. I was sure, I was positive, and absolutely calm, although I was struck to the bones and indignant with the political blindness and irresponsibility of these criminals.

It won’t last long, and it won’t succeed. Basically, that’s how it was. Seventy-two hours of total isolation and struggle. I think everything was done to psychologically break the president down. It is difficult, it’s also difficult to talk about it here. Every day, morning and evening, I put forth demands, and passed them on.

The demands were that communications of the president be re-established, that a plane was sent immediately to take me to Moscow, back to work, and . . . I added to the demands that they publish the refutation of this announcement made in front of you about the condition of my health by these very healthy people whose hands are trembling; you put forward very good questions and mocked them, this was a pure farce.

Old Radios Used

Question from audience: How did you get information from the dacha ?

A: Everything was down, but we found some type of old receivers in the maintenance rooms, and we fixed the antennae. There were some smart lads who know something about this--and we began to get whatever we could from there. We got the BBC best of all. The BBC came in best of all. (Radio) Liberty, and then the Voice of America came on.

I want to thank both Soviet and foreign journalists. I have just spoken on television to the Soviet people, I also said that people agreed--took the civil, the responsible position, and did not cooperate.

Everything that was done was done by force, I know. They have already told me a lot about what was going on. I want to tell you that I, all of us, have indeed seen the truth, that these six years in this country that we have gone through have not been wasted.

And with difficulty, and often painfully, we have looked for the path to move forward. This society--and now we can now speak about this--has rejected the putschists. They turned out to be isolated. They weren’t able to direct the army; the army made contact with the people, and nothing could be done about it. It became clear to them that they failed.

The republics took a negative position, and here I want to pay tribute and put in first place the principled position of our Russian Parliament, Russian deputies, Russian government officials, and the outstanding role of the president of Russia, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. I have to say that we also have to pay tribute to the principled positions of Muscovites and Leningraders, as well as people from many other regions. The attempt to make it look like the country almost supported and waited etc., and they even found--OK, you can find anything here now, but in principle, the country rejected this bloody path. It didn’t support it. I think we cannot think of better arguments, a better plebiscite, witnessing the actual position of the people. We cannot get in any better way.

Talks With Leaders

And all conversations that I had during these days, I spoke with many people, with President Bush, with (French) President (Francois) Mitterrand, with (German) Chancellor (Helmut) Kohl, (British) Prime Minister (John) Major, (Canadian Prime Minister Brian) Mulroney, (Australia Prime Minister Bob) Hawke, (Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki) Kaifu, (Italian Prime Minister Giulio) Andreotti, (Egyptian President Hosni) Mubarak--presidents, in general, except for (Libyan leader Moammar) Kadafi, (Iraqi leader Saddam) Hussein and (Latvian party chief Alfred) Rubiks.

I admit that processes taking place in the Baltics and in other republics are not easy. But to not see that the path of solving them is completely on a different plane, (it) is also political blindness.

That is why I am mentioned Rubiks. . . .

Basically, when it became clear, when Russia, its leadership, the republics and the people took such an irreconcilable position, that the army didn’t go, they (the junta) began to look for an exit in panic. They told me that the group of conspirators have arrived in the Crimea on the presidential plane, to talk to the president and to take him to Moscow. When they arrived, I said to put them in the house, detain them, and tell them my demands: I won’t talk to any of them until all the governmental communications are re-established.

They told me that it will take long. Never mind, I said, I am in a hurry to get anywhere. So the communications were turned back on, and I began to speak with the country. I spoke first with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. I called (Kazakh President Nursultan) Nazarbayev, (Ukraine President Leonid) Kravchuk, (Byelorussian President Nikolai) Dementei, (Uzbek President Islam) Karimov.

Terrible Strain

They told me that they are in position, I told them that I am in position here with my contingent. It was like that, 72 hours without anything, under this terrible strain. For example, suddenly the guards thought that we could be taken over from the sea. But as we learned later, just the opposite occurred. The sailors gave the president a sign that they could rescue him. The navy didn’t take part in these actions. But not only the navy. Even those that you saw (tanks) didn’t participate.

Then I started to work. I gave (Soviet Chief of Staff Gen. Mikhail) Moiseyev orders to take over the leadership of Defense Ministry, and he was also summoned from the Crimea and taken there. I gave troops orders to go back immediately to the places where they were located, to their barracks, and to announce that Yazov will be dismissed and arrested. All that was done.

I found the Kremlin commandant, asked him who is responsible for the regiment of the KGB, asked them to call its commander. They did, I gave him directions by telephone not to obey orders except for mine and the Kremlin commandant’s. He said that’s the way it will be. Basically I started calling to the most important points, to block everything at once.

Because everything was still dangerous and they could have destroyed me on my way (to Moscow) or anywhere. I decided not to go until--then they told me that a plane of the Russian delegation was coming, and I said I would receive them first of all. I got in touch with (Civil Aviation Minister Boris) Panyukov, with Moiseyev and told them to land . . . at the military airport where I usually land. Then I gave the orders to meet them there, to organize the transport to bring them here.

So the work started. The delegation arrived, we all sat down, came to great understanding. I think what we had suffered through has contributed not only to our experience but also to our understanding, the difference between a united democratic force and a divided one.

We can sometimes, discussing some questions, bash each others’ foreheads and denounce them to be almost enemies in relation to each other. Then we started to think how to get to Moscow.

Then (Communist Party Deputy General Secretary Vladimir) Ivashko and (Supreme Soviet Speaker Anatoly) Lukyanov arrived separately--they didn’t give them transport--and I received them. I didn’t receive the conspirators, I didn’t see them, and I don’t want to see them. We put them into different planes, brought them to Moscow, and getting off the plane, they were arrested and interned. . . . I gave an order to the Kremlin not to let anyone in who cooperated with that “Commandant.” And so forth, that is, so to say, the work has begun. I planned a meeting tomorrow with the leaders of the nine republics that (are expected to sign) the (Union) Treaty--who worked out the treaty and prepared it to be signed.

Tomorrow, we will meet and we should discuss everything. These were hard lessons, for me it has been the most difficult, it’s simply a hard trauma for me. I think that tomorrow we will come close to discussing, seriously thinking about and developing the positions on the main questions of moving forward and what new steps to take. We have to think about this, we have to see not only the great sorrow that occurred, but also we have to see what an enormous chance this event opened up to us, how it showed the true position of the people.

In conversations with foreign leaders . . . they all drew attention to this fact, that the position of the people and the army showed that the Soviet Union has already gone through changes that were irreversible. For that reason they hope will take advantage of all opportunities, and they all said that they will cooperate with us, and that this cooperation should take more active forms, more decisive ones. Today I received 12 ambassadors from the (European Community) countries, they all showed their solidarity and support.

About the decisions that were made: I issued a decree that annulled the decrees. You know, it looked like they could destroy or do anything, I don’t know what, to my family, to me, to everyone who was with me, and tell (the people) that the president has such and such a position. Moreover, they could say that they were acting on orders from him. For that reason, at the press conference I saw all this craftiness, though a primitive one, crude. As one of the comrades in the Russian Federation said, ‘They can’t even do this properly, like the other things they do.’

I decided to immediately make four tapes (of myself), I’ve made four tapes, Irina and Anatoly (daughter and son-in-law) have cut them into four sections and we started to look for channels whom we could trust to send them. Here is the tape, one of them, (holds up a tape), the others may appear because they have, in any case, gone. The doctor wrote his opinion, several copies, and we gave them out, I distributed them so that the people knew the actual state of the condition of the health of the president. And I finally put forward the first four points in written form, I wrote some things by hand so that people could see that it was I who wrote it, although the four points are typed out, and I signed it.

Point 1: The fact that (Vice President Gennady) Yanayev took over the responsibilities of president on the pretext of my illness and inability to fulfill responsibilities is a deception of the people, and given this, can only be considered a governmental coup.

Point 2: This means that all the actions that followed are illegal. Neither the president nor the Congress of People’s Deputies delegated such responsibility to Yanayev.

Point 3: I ask to tell Lukyanov my demand to immediately convene a meeting of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies to consider the situation that emerged. They and only they, having considered the emerging situation, have the right to solve the problems of taking and putting into effect necessary government measures.

Point 4: I demand immediately to freeze the actions of the State Committee of the State of Emergency until the Supreme Soviet or the Congress of People’s Deputies pass the aforementioned decisions.

The continuation of these actions, the further escalation of the measures taken by the State Committee for the State of Emergency, could turn out to be a tragedy for all the peoples.

Now the most important thing is to adopt decisions, I adopted, I annulled all the decisions of the vice president, the committee and the Cabinet that were made these past days. I dismissed, relieved of their responsibilities those who occupied those posts, using the power given to me, and gave the Supreme Court (things) that it needs to consider. The prosecutor’s office, the prosecutor of the Russian Federation, reported to me that yesterday he began criminal proceedings, and we agreed that the group should include both Russian and Soviet investigators.

Temporary decisions were adopted in cases where in certain agencies (where) people could not be trusted, not even for a single day. Tomorrow, when we meet with the leaders of the republics, we’ll start to think over the disposition of forces among other problems. . . .

We cannot lose. We have a program, we have to move and solve the problems, this is the most important thing.

But enough for the introduction.

Question: Why did you ever pick as your colleagues the people who eventually led the coup?

Answer: My goal during all these years--and I will never tell you everything--but my goal was to bring about and preserve this political course. I saw my duty was to preserve the course of perestroika , and for the first time in the history of our country to solve everything in a bloodless way.

Q: What is your attitude to the decrees of the Russian president, the decisions of the Russian parliament?

A: I have to say that at 7 a.m. (Thursday) I tried to go to bed for a while and there was a knock on the door and somebody brought me the whole package of decrees issued by the Russian authorities. I have read them. And I think that the Russians were acting in the highest interest and what they enacted was in the highest interest. The measures they adopted were dictated by the situation that emerged.

Q: It was obvious even before they were promoted to high governmental positions that the eight leaders of the coup were bastards because it was written on their faces. Why did you stand for them?

A: I already said on Soviet Television that this was also a good lesson for me, now I see that the (Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies) was right when it first did not elect Yanayev and I insisted. This was my mistake, and not my only mistake. Now I see this. I can tell you frankly that I especially trusted Yazov and Kryuchkov.

Q: What lessons have you learned; how will your behavior change; how did you change as a man?

A: To decisively advance with reforms, and for this I need the regrouping of (political) forces, and we should start it immediately. If we don’t have concerted action, we won’t have reforms, and we must start on this immediately.

Role of Party

Q: Why did the Communist Party stay quiet during the coup?

A: My position is to rid the party of reactionary forces. The new party program could be a basis for this. But when you speak of the whole Communist Party as a reactionary force, I don’t agree. I know thousands, hundreds of people--by the way, they are sitting here--who are genuine democrats, supporters of perestroika , and they don’t give up . . .

Concerning the position of Communists, most of them, especially those in the ranks, excluding certain committees, they stayed on the sidelines. (But) the leadership and the Secretariat made it necessary for (No. 2 party chief Vladimir) Ivashko to come out of the hospital where he had an operation to stop them because the party had reached a blind alley--well, not the party, but the leadership. But in the end, even in the Secretariat, the healthy forces, by their actions inspired the right decisions to be made. As a result two people . . . announced they quit the Politburo, because they didn’t support the demand to support the decrees of the Emergency Committee.

Yeltsin’s Stature

Q: Does Yeltsin have more power than you right now?

A: I wouldn’t form the question that way. Boris Nikolayevich and I have done everything in recent days and months so that our cooperation results in the uniting of all democratic forces with all the republics. That’s the most important thing. Many people would like to confront us, and there are so many lies. The situation gave us new strength, and now we know who is who.

Family Affected

Q: How did your family endure this trying time? Why did you think the plotters attempted the coup?

A: My granddaughter, Anastasia, took it the best. She didn’t understand anything, she was running around, asking everyone to take her to the beach . . . and we had to take her. The last days guards asked us to stop, because anything could happen, anything at all. So we locked ourselves up, so to speak. It was difficult to take it all. Raisa Maximovna and my daughter took it very hard. Yesterday Raisa Maximovna was not well. But this seems to have been (just a brief) episode. . . . Those who have experienced such situations will be able to understand me.

I don’t think (the coup leaders) had any mental disorders. . . . It was a conscious choice. There is the part of society that either doesn’t want or is scared of changes. These are the leaders of this part of society.

Q: Are you going to meet with (resigned former aide Alexander) Yakovlev?

A: I think that even the things I learned from the press when I was on vacation about the Central (Control) Commission’s decision on the Yakovlev issue say a lot about that there is definitely still a hard battle for the reformation of the party. Given that a month ago the commission had considered an issue and concluded that no actions should be taken, and now they have changed everything without consulting him. I also knew nothing. This all means that something is wrong in the party. I feel sorry that the forces that should reform the party are leaving it. I won’t give up, I will stand until the end.