COLUMN LEFT/ HARLEY BALZER : The Guide Becomes the Obstacle : Gorbachev has lost his timing, his patience, his ability to listen. He just doesn’t get it.

For five years, Mikhail Gorbachev dem onstrated, for a Soviet leader, an unprecedented political talent. He had the ability to learn on the job and make dramatic changes on the basis of those lessons. But in the past year that learning process appears to have stopped. Gorbachev just doesn’t get it these days.

Watching Gorbachev’s performance in the week following the failed coup was downright painful. He made enough political mistakes to damage even a beloved national leader, much less a politician as roundly disliked as Gorbachev.

On the day he returned to Moscow, Gorbachev spoke of renewing the Communisty Party, failing to realize that he was associating himself with the one political entity less popular than himself.

But Gorbachev seems to have lost the ability to listen. He was willing to spend days in protracted discussions with hundreds of Communist Party leaders before the 19th Party Conference. But in the Supreme Soviet he acts too often like a petty autocrat, while Boris Yeltsin has learned the virtues of established institutional procedure.

In politics, timing is everything. Had Gorbachev been a candidate in a popular election for president in 1988 or 1989, he would almost certainly have been victorious. Such a mandate might have prevented the coup attempt, and would also have done much to improve the chances for preserving the union. But Gorbachev, believing in the Communist Party and socialism, and perhaps fearing the consequences of the changes he unleashed, chose to base his position on an indirect election. Now he would be lucky to win a race for a seat in the legislature from a rural district.

There is a unique process that takes place when a politician is elected by the people. It is almost as if a special gland is surgically inserted, radiating power. Capitol Hill staffers know it well--just watch the self-effacing behavior of Senate staff when a senator is in the room, compared to their tendency to preen the rest of the time. Boris Yeltsin and a slew of what Gorbachev’s cronies refer to as “so-called democrats” know this feeling of legitimate power. It is a sensation that Gorbachev will never experience.

Gorbachev is a genuine hero of the 20th Century. His role in the liberation of Eastern Europe, initiation of glasnost, advancement of disarmament and dismantling of the communist system guarantee him a unique place in history. But they do not mean he is the best leader to oversee the next stages in Russia’s evolution.

Gorbachev’s final mistake may have been his “threat” to resign if the union is not preserved. He associated himself with an empire that has few other defenders. Survey data show that even many of the Slavs living in the Baltic republics favor independence. For the past year it seemed that the future size of the Soviet Union was inversely proportional to the length of time that Gorbachev remained in office.

Rarely missing an opportunity to stay behind the curve on political changes in Russia, the Bush Administration continues to cling to a politician with single-digit approval ratings. Loyalty is admirable in friendship. In geopolitics, it can be fatal.

The tendency to hang on to Gorbachev reflects a lack of understanding of what is happening in the Soviet Union. Long-term processes of social change in that society were largely responsible for someone like Gorbachev becoming Communist Party general secretary in the first place. Now those processes of change--education, urbanization, communication, and international contact--have created a society that is ready for genuine democratic leadership.

Russia is engaged in a “transition to democracy” similar to that taking place in other European countries. Success in this transition is not guaranteed, but neither is it precluded. Social and political change are always wrenching, but this does not mean that the processes have to be cataclysmic. Civil war, communal violence and massive dislocations are possible, but certainly not inevitable. With wise leadership and some international help, Russia might just weather the transition.

Gorbachev deserves enormous gratitude for advancing the process. But that does not mean he is the best leader to oversee its continuation. Few leaders have presided over a complete transition--the skills needed at different stages are simply too diverse. At this juncture, a non-Russian like Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev or Eduard Shevardnadze might have greater credibility as leader of a multi-republic union. The greatest tragedy will be if Gorbachev becomes an obstacle to the very achievements for which he deserves so much credit.