THE WORLD : U.S. Repackages Old South Asia Policies in a New Bottle : Emphasizing commerce while downplaying security concerns will prolong our uneven ties to India and Pakistan.

Diplomatic old-speak met foreign policy new-speak in South Asia last month, revealing a hole at the heart of U.S. policy toward the region. Defense Secretary William J. Perry and Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown, both recently returned from India and Pakistan, sought to replace the old security-based U.S. diplomacy with commerce-based engagement.

Their visits suggest, however, that a new diplomatic approach may be appropriate for India but not for Pakistan, thus perpetuating their uneven relationships with the United States; old diplomacy is not working in Pakistan, further unbalancing U.S. foreign policy. Ultimately, what works in India may not count as foreign policy at all. In both countries, the United States may be sacrificing development of a serious policy for limited, peripheral goals that can, in the longer term, jeopardize U.S. interests.

Perry tried to put U.S. relations with both India and Pakistan on a more equal footing by agreeing to cooperate militarily with each of them. Although the pact with India falls short of providing it with access to high technology, India hopes that continuing good relations will lay the groundwork for closer military-to-military relations and expanded trade, eventually leading the United States to treat India like a burgeoning world power. Perry’s agreement formalized a U.S.-India relationship that had, by virtue of tacit agreements and explicit cooperation, already changed.

But money talks. When Perry raised contentious issues like nuclear proliferation, human rights and the war in Kashmir with Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, he did so only privately. His visit was really a prelude to Brown’s, which is what India was waiting for. Accompanied by 25 U.S. businessmen, Brown signed billions of dollars of contracts covering a wide range of commercial sectors.

But old security problems, and old imbalances, don’t disappear behind fond hopes. While Brown was happily increasing trade and creating jobs, Perry was struggling to find a way to improve crisis-riven Indian-Pakistani relations. Although its government faces many internal challenges, India is not inclined to alter its domestic or foreign policies. Perhaps more important, Pakistan’s government is weak, its public support weaker, and its economy weaker still.

Part of the problem results from outmoded U.S. policy. Forced by Congress to cut off aid until Pakistan allows inspection of its nuclear facilities, Washington has scurried to circumvent congressional restrictions without directly responding to congressional concerns. By targeting Pakistan but not India, Congress has not made non-proliferation easy in South Asia. It is India, not Pakistan, that can deploy Prithvi missiles with nuclear weapons, perhaps restarting a regional arms race.

Still, Pakistan has made nuclear control much more difficult. Its leaders pugnaciously defy world opinion and common sense, sanctifying their nuclear program rather than truly limiting it.

U.S. non-proliferation policy may be dying a quiet death in South Asia. Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto announced that by visiting Islamabad, Perry, in effect, accepted Pakistan’s nuclear posture. Perry said little to dispute this. Although Bhutto’s uncompromising rhetoric may preempt her domestic critics, it also indicates that Pakistan has yet to face up to the threat that nuclear weapons present. If the United States remains silent--for the sake of superficial concord and seeming even-handedness in South Asia--it will be complicit in the weapons madness that could follow.

U.S. pro-democracy policy is not faring much better. India’s rights violations are seldom criticized. But closer economic cooperation between the two countries will bring India’s repressive security laws into bolder relief.

In Pakistan, democratic fissures imperil U.S. policy even more. Bhutto has pointedly acquiesced to the military, hoping obeisance will ensure her tenure. Military procurements and foreign policy are designed to limit dissent from the army. Pakistan’s politicians strike bargains with the army rather than stand up for democratic principle, weakening political institutions as a matter of course. Given the hand-in-glove relationship between the ruling party and army--to the vocal dismay of the Pakistani electorate--Perry’s military accord with Islamabad tells Pakistanis that the United States, by its willingness to speak directly to the army, will bypass genuine democratization.

This familiar route for the United States--it’s the way we propped up dictators for decades--misreads South Asia’s politics. Business-as-usual never works in Pakistan. Social disharmony, political disarray and economic disequilibrium almost always blunt U.S. policy, and certainly dishearten Pakistanis.

The United States treats Bhutto as Pakistan’s more reasonable political alternative, believing her to be useful in three arenas: curbing nuclear proliferation, containing Iran and limiting Islamic extremism. Bhutto, however, is no more likely than her domestic opponents to give up nuclear weapons, for Pakistan stubbornly believes that weapons help to balance its power with India’s. Additionally, no Pakistani government will risk a closer relationship with Iran, for that would threaten Pakistan’s delicate relations with its Arab donors. In both cases, then, the United States is bribing Pakistan to do what it would do anyway.

Finally, Bhutto has proved unable to curtail intolerance in her country, and seems uninterested in doing so. Resurgent Islam is a political movement that often forms in response to economic discrimination and political alienation--and rampant political and economic corruption define politics in Pakistan. Bhutto is an unlikely bulwark against Islamists, and an unstable ally for the United States.

The Perry-Brown roadshow thus encouraged economic engagement in India without any political price, and continued political-military engagement in Pakistan at a high price, indeed. If Prime Minister Rao didn’t blink when Perry mentioned Kashmir, it was because he didn’t have to--Brown was on his way to prove that it was unimportant. And if Bhutto could rail against nuclear control before, during and after Perry’s visit, it was because she, too, could ignore the interests of others. Neither Rao nor Bhutto seem to understand that their actions have serious consequences; neither Perry nor Brown seem very interested in explaining this to them.

The contest between old-speak and new-speak showed the United States isn’t saying much at all.