High Anxiety

At midnight June 30, Hong Kong will revert to China. It is a moment fraught with peril and promise. For China, as the authors of this sober and balanced book note, is on the verge of becoming one of the world’s great economic power, but one beset by anxieties--some legitimate, some not--over its security. How China attempts to resolve its security dilemma, and how other nations respond, will largely determine whether a successful post-Cold War order will be established in the 21st century.

Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross are two of America’s leading scholars on Chinese politics and foreign policy. Their book is a welcome corrective to the dire predictions of war and overheated jeremiads heard so often during this time of troubled United States-China relations. Nathan and Ross harbor no illusions about the real difficulties posed by China’s emergence as a great power, but they offer something that alarmists fail to do: a realistic assessment of China’s actual security predicament.

The metaphors in the book’s title help the authors make their point well. The “great wall,” of course, refers to the ancient fortification that symbolizes the ability of China’s leaders to mobilize immense resources for security purposes, but the wall also dramatically illustrates China’s historic geopolitical vulnerability. The wall’s purpose was to protect the country from neighboring enemies, but it failed dismally on a number of occasions. Thus, the wall emphasizes the persistent precarious nature of China’s geographical place.

China’s leaders--no matter if they were imperial/feudal, nationalist or Communist--have in the past, and will for the foreseeable future, look at a challenging environment. During the last 50 years, easily within the personal memory of tens of millions of Chinese, the country has been embroiled in major military conflicts with every neighbor or at every point along the perimeter of its vast territory: with Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, with the United States on the Korean peninsula in the early 1950s, with India in the early 1960s, with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and with the Vietnamese Communists in the late 1970s. A good case can be made that defensive considerations largely explain China’s behavior in each instance. And although China’s border areas are more stable and secure than at any other time in the 20th century, the potential for trouble for Beijing remains.

The other metaphor in the book’s title, the “empty fortress,” refers to an incident described in “Romance of the Three Kingdoms,” a Chinese classic of war and politics. Facing a superior invading force, a wily commander threw open his city’s gates, disguised his soldiers as civilian laborers and lounged with a flute in full view on the defensive parapets. The enemy, concluding that such nonchalance indicated a strong defense and possible trick, delayed their attack. The city’s commander won the crucial time he needed for the arrival of reinforcements.

In this way, the “empty fortress” symbolizes the use of stratagem in China’s state-craft; the element of maneuver, bluff and deception in dealing with adversaries. And like the “great wall,” the fortress suggests both weakness and strength. Chinese leaders have often resorted to creating appearances of strength to overcome actual weaknesses.

Throughout this century, China has eluded foreign understanding because of the opaqueness of its political processes. Chinese success in veiling intentions complicates matters too. Thus, American observers often fall into interpretive traps. One of these is demonizing China, as was done earlier in this century when its people were seen as the “yellow peril,” a racialized threat to Western civilization, or during much of the Cold War, when the Chinese Communists were feared as a fanatical horde bent on world domination. Neither view was accurate.

Another trap has been to project Western values and hopes onto the Chinese, thereby transforming them into proto-Americans. Nineteenth century missionaries, the lobbyists for the Chinese nationalists in the 1940s and 1950s and even many supporters of China’s post-Cultural Revolution move toward an open society were bitterly disillusioned when China did not meet their expectations.

Nathan and Ross help us to understand that China is neither fundamentally “different” nor the “same” by showing that China has particular security dilemmas and that these are linked to concerns shared by all states. China’s specific problems include having a huge land mass with vulnerable and disquieted border regions (Tibet, western China and Inner Mongolia); the most vibrant regional economic environment in the world today, but with aggressive competitors and powerful potential adversaries; a booming coastal and urban economy increasingly integrated into world markets and cultures, but with hundreds of millions of restless citizens trailing far behind in the hinterland; and, most important, unmet irredentist objectives. Hong Kong returns to Chinese jurisdiction Monday, and Macao in 1999, but there is no resolution in sight to the emotional issue of Taiwan. The continuing stalemate, in the view of Nathan and Ross, has become nothing less than “the most tenacious international issue of the post-World War II era.”

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These security dilemmas touch the basic interests of every state: social prosperity and stability, territorial integrity, leadership legitimacy and national security. The authors highlight the magnitude of the problems facing China by comparing its security position to that of the United States. The United States, for example, faces none of the territorial issues that Beijing does. Nathan and Ross see China, given its circumstances, as notably consistent, rational and defensive in its actions.

Take, for example, the development of its military capabilities. One often hears about a growing Chinese threat. But Nathan and Ross show that Beijing has substantially reduced military spending as part of its effort to stimulate a market economy. Although it seeks to modernize its armed forces, it does so facing considerable budget constraints and wary neighbors, such as Japan. If Tokyo felt threatened and accelerated its own defense program, the gap between China’s security needs and capabilities would actually widen.

China’s military is equipped with an array of outmoded weaponry. The People’s Liberation Army, which includes the navy and air force, is “the world’s largest military museum” and “junkyard army.” Ninety percent of its aircraft is “obsolete.” According to Nathan and Ross, China’s 1994 defense budget (in U.S. dollars) totaled $6 billion, compared to $282 billion for the United States, $42 billion for Japan and $11 billion for Taiwan. Even allowing for considerable hidden expenditures, China’s military budget could hardly be characterized as dangerously robust.

Nathan and Ross do concede that there is much about China’s search for security that is unpredictable and a cause for concern. One cannot know how the tensions on the militarized and volatile Korean peninsula will play out. Nor can one know what might happen among China’s Muslim or Tibetan minorities, who in recent years have increasingly displayed their dissatisfaction with the central government. In May, for instance, a small bomb exploded in downtown Beijing; the authorities believe that it is linked to separatist elements among China’s minorities. Future crises on and within China’s borders may make it difficult for China’s leaders to pursue stable policies consistent with calculated national interests.

There is also the problem of leadership and bureaucratic effectiveness in China in the post-Deng era. Even though his only official post in the latter years of his life was as honorary chairman of the Chinese Bridge Assn., Deng Xiaoping, like Mao Tse-tung before him, wielded unchallenged personal power. Such centralized authority allowed for both remarkable consistency in policy and dramatic shifts, such as China’s opening to the United States in the early 1970s. But China’s current leaders have neither the personal authority of their predecessors nor a fully effective and reliable civilian or military administrative apparatus. Its absence may account for the dramatic gaps between declared policies and actions in such sensitive areas as arms sales to Middle Eastern nations, human rights violations and theft of intellectual property. China’s leaders also may be less able to pursue flexible courses of action and negotiation with other parties.

Most worrisome is the future of Taiwan. Beijing appears to be encountering setbacks in its effort to win the island back to the embrace of the motherland. Taiwan, for its part, has engineered a remarkable turn-about. Once isolated and insecure about its identity, Taiwan is recovering a degree of stature and influence in the international community. Moreover, the growing strength of a local Taiwanese identity, with some calling for the island’s independence, lends even greater unpredictability to the situation. Reuniting Taiwan with the mainland will remain perhaps the highest national priority for Beijing, but if the end appears unattainable, then what?

What does all this mean for the United States? Nathan and Ross offer few specifics for American policymakers beyond encouraging what amounts to the “constructive engagement” policy that Republican and Democratic administrations alike have followed. The authors promote approaches that enhance the existing balance of power and stability in Asia today, but they leave specific policy recommendations to others. Nevertheless, “The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress” well illuminates the contours of China’s complex security problems. It is the authors’ hope that a better understanding of China’s concerns will help “Western policymakers accommodate China when they should, persuade China when they can, and resist China when they must.” Their fine book is indispensable for anyone seeking a deeper, more nuanced understanding of one of the world’s more enigmatic nations, whose importance and power will continue to grow in the years to come.