Enough of Sanctions: Take Saddam Hussein Out

Saddam Hussein’s relentless drive to dominate the Persian Gulf at any cost poses a grave threat to the vital interests of the United States. Unfortunately, neither the wishful thinking of the U.N. Security Council nor Washington’s efforts to contain Baghdad with economic sanctions and “no-fly zones” will change Hussein’s determination to fulfill his self-proclaimed destiny to lead Arab, Islamic and Third World countries. The only policy that will is a U.S.-led effort to eliminate Hussein’s regime and establish, over a period of years, a democratic Iraq.

Hussein’s contempt for the U.N. sanctions that followed Operation Desert Storm in 1991 isn’t surprising. Since seizing power from his father-in-law in 1976, the Iraqi leader has used every means at his disposal to pursue his ambitions. He invaded Iran and Kuwait. He used chemical agents against Iranians and Iraqi Kurds. He launched Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran. He brutally crushed Iraqi rebels. He personally executed Iraqi Cabinet officers whom he claimed were plotting against him, including members of his own family. He initiated terrorist attacks against Arab, U.S. and European targets and unabashedly developed nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Hussein’s current challenge to the United Nations and its weapons inspectors is a calculated gamble: The benefits of possessing weapons of mass destruction outweigh the risk of the world community doing what it takes to stop him. That Hussein is taking the gamble suggests that Iraq is poised to achieve its long-term objectives.

Operation Desert Storm and its aftermath demonstrate conclusively that political and economic sanctions alone cannot liberate Kuwait or Iraq, protect Saudi Arabia nor diminish Hussein’s ambitions. The idea that the newest sanctions--travel restrictions on top Iraqi officials, among them--will have any constructive impact on Baghdad is simply absurd.

Indeed, the Security Council’s spineless behavior, rooted in the feckless desire of France and Russia to enhance commercial opportunities and preserve their political ties, only encourages Hussein to pursue his goals with greater boldness. In an attempt to rally Arab support while further dividing, and, if possible, destroying, the remnants of the Gulf War coalition, Hussein has expelled American members of the U.N. weapons inspection teams and threatens to launch missiles at U.S. aircraft.

To end Hussein’s megalomania and threat to world peace, the United States must lead the coalition to decisive action. If not, the United States must go it alone.

Nothing less than a major shift in U.S. policy will be required to liberate Iraq. The United States must replace its failed policy of containment with an explicit campaign to remove Hussein and his Baath Party cohorts from power. There is no practical alternative to a policy--unilaterally, if necessary, together with like-minded states, if possible--that frees the Iraqi people from Hussein’s reign of terror by eliminating the security apparatus that keeps him in power.

This will not be achieved by economic sanctions, U.N. weapons inspectors or limited military strikes. This can only be achieved by a systematic campaign that weakens the props preserving Hussein’s power while promoting a rebellion inside Iraq.

In pursuing such a policy, the president should expect harsh criticism from countries more interested in collaborating with Hussein than in removing him from power. The Russians, French and Chinese will be joined by many in the Arab world who will condemn the United States for interfering in the internal affairs of another country. A growing chorus of U.S. isolationists will add their dissent.

Nevertheless, the United States must set aside the importance it currently attaches to multilateralism, an attachment that plays into Hussein’s hands. Leadership by consensus does not work when there is no consensus. As with Operation Desert Storm, international support is more likely to emerge when Washington commits itself to a course of action and has the capacity and will to achieve its goals.

Any U.S. campaign against Iraq must take into account the Afghanistan experience of military success but political failure. It is crucial that the mistakes that led to the victory of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalist forces there not be repeated in Iraq. This will require a far-reaching and expensive effort by the United States, Turkey and Arab allies to overcome competing interests and to support the establishment of a genuinely democratic Iraq.

Operating from Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Iraqi opposition groups must be provided with the money, arms and training necessary to defeat Hussein. The CIA must stimulate and support opposition to the regime in Baghdad.

The liberation of Iraq should begin in the north, an area populated by rival Kurdish factions with long-standing grievances against Hussein. The United States already maintains command of the air there. A strong presence on the ground can take advantage of this air superiority to reconcile Kurdish factions, arm and train other opposition forces and launch strikes against Iraqi police and security forces.

While this will require the negotiation of new political agreements to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, Iraqi threats to Turkish security are sufficient to warrant a rethinking of Turkish policy toward Iraq.

But it is not enough to promote rebellion in Iraq. Simultaneously, decisive force must be used against Hussein’s Republican Guards, the core of the Iraqi army and Iraq’s manufacturing facilities and storage depots of weapons of mass destruction. Acquiescence in the continued existence of these weapons is intolerable. In the face of a determined coalition--or U.S.--military campaign, Hussein can be counted on to lash out at his neighbors, including Israel, with all the means at his disposal. It is essential that we do all we can to ensure that this confrontation is fought on our terms, not his.

Finally, these circumstances argue for a renewed attempt by Washington to stimulate a dialogue with the government of Iran. Having suffered gravely at the hands of Hussein, Iran and the United States have a common interest in ending Iraq’s threats to the region.

The election of President Mohammad Khatami, a pragmatic politician who seems to want to move Iran back toward the mainstream of international society, has yet to prove a sufficient inducement to Washington to open a dialogue. But, at a minimum, a dialogue with Iran would permit Washington and Iran to avoid misunderstandings, be perceived as a change in the regional balance of power and could, over time, lead to a measure of coordination against Iraq.

It will not be easy to stop Hussein. He is determined and ruthless. The international community, moreover, is divided and grows weary of trying to contain him.

At the end of World War II, the allies occupied Germany, disarmed it and helped restore a thriving industrial democracy. We have an opportunity to achieve comparable results in Iraq. The fundamental question is whether we will wait for Hussein to launch another war of aggression, this time with all the weapons at his disposal, before we act to end this menace to civilization.