Damage Control Is Our Best Hope

The only thing worse than having the ill-conceived summit meeting with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow this week is canceling it now. It was a mistake to schedule the summit several months ago; the White House originally stated on several occasions that President Clinton would not go to Moscow until the START II arms control treaty was ratified by the Russian parliament. That did not happen.

There were no good reasons for reversing the administration’s initial position beyond once again providing a helping hand to Yeltsin and creating a high-profile distraction from Clinton’s troubles at home. There are no major agreements to sign and there is no potential for breakthrough on any of the number of important foreign policy disagreements between Washington and Moscow. Moreover, as a result of his declining physical and mental capabilities, Yeltsin is no longer someone with whom one can conduct serious business.

As far as diplomacy is concerned, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright already are in regular contact. Economic matters are handled by a well-functioning commission chaired by Vice President Al Gore and whomever happens to be prime minister in Russia at the time--first Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, then Sergei V. Kiriyenko, now Chernomyrdin again.

Yet canceling the summit during Russia’s political and financial crisis sends the wrong message. It would likely create the impression that the administration was not only ending its excessive fixation with Bill’s friend Boris, but severing ties with Russia as well. That could contribute to the continuing financial collapse and fuel a new anti-American backlash in Russia. Many Russians would say that the U.S. had helped to keep the corrupt and inept semi-authoritarian Yeltsin regime in power for years only to abandon Russia in its time of greatest need.

Russia remains important to the United States. Though it is no longer a superpower--its gross domestic product is just 7% of America’s and falling, its shrinking armed forces are demoralized and in disarray and it has no international followers outside of the clownish Belarus President Alexander G. Lukashenko--Russia retains thousands of nuclear weapons. It also produces a number of highly sophisticated missiles and other arms which, in the wrong hands, could imperil the U.S. and its friends. Finally, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia has a veto power that could significantly limit America’s ability to win the U.N.’s blessing in international actions.

The United States may not be in a position to save Russia from itself, but it is certainly not in the American interest to contribute to Russia’s destabilization and anti-American drift. So Clinton has no choice but to go to Moscow.

He will encounter a Russian government that wants above all to hear that it can expect another U.S.-orchestrated bailout. That is not in the cards. The most Clinton can do is encourage the International Monetary Fund to be more flexible in releasing the remaining tranches of the $22.6-billion rescue package announced in July.

Similarly, Clinton’s Russian hosts are unlikely to do much to accommodate his concerns. The foreign policy disagreements between Moscow and Washington are may, including over Kosovo’s civil war, nuclear nonproliferation, Iran and Iraq, international terrorism and pipeline routes out of the Caspian Basin. The Russian government understands the extent to which it depends on American goodwill in receiving international economic assistance, but even its most pro-Western officials complain that the United States demands that Russia walk in lock-step with its foreign policy. Even if the Russian government were prepared to give in, nationalist pressures from the parliament would limit its flexibility.

Clinton will be helped by the fact that whatever Russians think of the United States, they realize that it is the sole superpower in the world and that it holds considerable leverage over their country. The best thing Clinton can do in Moscow is use his communication skills to show compassion for Russians’ hardships, treat Yeltsin with respect but no special affection and--without making unjustified substantive concessions--demonstrate that the United States still considers Russia to be an important power. It won’t make for a meaningful summit. But under the circumstances, damage limitation may be the best we can hope for.